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Interpretative Challenges of
28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the Aftermath
of Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc.
ABSTRACT

The rise of globalization and the normalization of transnational
commercial agreements motivated the United States to make
commitments that seek to facilitate the resolution of international
litigationand dispute resolutionprocesses. One of the byproducts of the
United States' commitment to internationalcooperation is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782, a statute that opens American courts to foreign parties seeking
discovery for use in foreign proceedings. Continuous amendments to

this statute, paired with a Supreme Court decision that provided an
overly vague, unworkable balancing test, gave free rein to lower courts'
discretionarypowers, ultimately resulting in a myriad of conflicting

decisions. This Note seeks to address some of the aforementioned
conflicts and proposes an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 that would
reduce the extent to which courts'discretionarypowers play a role in the
outcome of

§ 1782 requests, resulting in a more straightforward

applicationof the statute.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The advent of modern means of communication, paired with the
increased availability of international transportation, has multiplied
the opportunities to enter in international transactions and dealings.'

Naturally, these cross-border transactions have been tied to an
increase of international litigation, as well as domestic litigation with

an international component. 2 Although the federal powers of the
United States have recognized the unique procedural challenges
presented by international litigation since at least 1855,3 it was not
until the middle of the twentieth century that Congress started to
substantially regulate the ability of federal domestic courts to assist in
4
obtaining evidence for use in foreign and international proceedings.

See Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65
1.
COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1015 (1965) [hereinafter Smit, International Litigation]
(introducing the conditions under which the United States Congress decided to create
the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure).
See id. (explaining how the increase and expansion of international litigation
2.
"enhanced the need for rules that promote just, speedy, and inexpensive adjudication of
disputes with international elements."). For examples of legal cases presenting a "foreign
element" issue, see Sagi Peari, Which Law Applies to Adjudicate Litigation with a
Foreign Element?, OUPBLOG (May 28, 2018), https://blog.oup.com/2018/05/lawadjudicate-litigation-foreign-element/ [https://perma.cc/JSF7-4ZHU] (archived July 16,
2020).
See Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (giving the United States
3.
government the power to execute letters rogatory).

See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743 (creating a
4.
Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure);
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004).
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Since 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 17825 has provided a mechanism for
foreign parties and tribunals to take depositions and obtain discovery
from companies and individuals located within the United States for

use in foreign or international proceedings. 6 A product of decades of
experimentation and subject to continuous changes, 7 the provision
seeks to fulfill a dual set of aims: providing an efficient means of
assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging

foreign countries to provide a similar means of support to US courts. 8
However, the continuous amendments to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782 and its

increasingly broad scope have created confusion for both foreign and
domestic parties. 9 The uncertainty regarding how to interpret a variety

of aspects covered by

§ 1782 has only worsened after a series of

conflicting and unclear judicial interventions.' 0 The Supreme Court's

5.

28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2018) states in relevant part:
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or
is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to

produce a document or other thing for use in a proceedingin a foreign
or international tribunal, including criminal investigations
conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made
pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or
international tribunal or upon the application of any interested
person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or
the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed
by the court. By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has
power to administer any necessary oath and take the testimony or
statement. The order may prescribe the practice and procedure,
which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the
foreign country or the internationaltribunal,for taking the testimony
or statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent

that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or
statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced,
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement
or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally
applicableprivilege.
§ 1782(a) (emphasis added).
6.
See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782, 62 Stat. 103; 1 JAMES W.M. MOORE
& KEVIN SHIREY, MOORE'S FEDERAL RULES PAMPHLET, pt. 4, § 1782.2, 782-86 (Matthew
Bender & Co. 2019) (explaining how the statute operates).
7.
See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 247-49 (reviewing the amendment history of the
statute).
8.
See, e.g., In re Metallgesellschaft, 121 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Malev
Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the dual aims of the
statute and how they inform the judicial inquiry).
9.
See Michael Campion Miller, Alejandro G. Rosenberg & Michael Stoll, 28
U.S.C. § 1782 and the Evolution of InternationalJudicialAssistance in United States
Courts, May 2012 FED. LAW. 44, 44-47 (examining the gradual change undergone by the
statute and its status after Supreme Court intervention).
10. See Sarah LaFreniere, Inconsistent Case Law on 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Continues to
Confuse
Litigants and
District
Courts, HAUSFELD
(Nov.
8,
2018),
https://www.hausfeld.com/news-press/inconsistent-case-law-on-28-u.s. c-1782-continues-
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holding in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (Intel) sought to

provide lower courts with answers to some of these interpretative
conflicts while equipping them with a set of balancing factors to assist
in a foreign proceeding.11

in the determination of whether to grant aid

Far from solving these problems, Intel has generated further
debate as to the interpretation of § 1782, ultimately leading to several
federal circuit court splits and diverging interpretations of the
statute.1 2 The circuit courts disagree on a number of issues, including:
(1) the extraterritorial reach of the statute, (2) whether "foreign or
international tribunals" under § 1782 should be read to include
international arbitral tribunals, (3) the impact of applicant delay in

requesting aid on the courts' ability to grant discovery, and (4) whether
an applicant's ability to obtain discovery pursuant to

§ 1782 extends to

a foreign party's US legal counsel, and if it does, whether the
applicant's potential to reach documents held by US legal counsel

extends to documents that have been declared confidential in the
3
context of a domestic proceeding.'

to-confuse-litigants-and-district-courts [https://perma.cc/M7KZ-WYJ9] (archived July
16, 2020) (discussing conflicting circuit court decisions and highlighting some underlying
interpretative problems that are contributing to such conflict).
11. Intel sought to resolve the issues arising from § 1782 by explicitly solving some
of the existing conflicts and by establishing four discretionary factors for courts to
consider before granting a § 1782 discovery request. These factors contemplate whether
(1) the party requesting the discovery is one of the parties to the foreign proceeding, (2)
the foreign tribunal's attitude towards U.S. assistance, (3) the request is an attempt to
circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or public policies, and (4)
burdensomeness of fulfilling the request. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 241-66.
12. See, e.g., LaFreniere, supra note 10 (introducing an interpretation conflict
between the Second and Third Circuit as to whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782 allows to obtain
discovery from a "foreign-litigant's U.S. counsel"); Julia Sherman, Section 1782
Discovery: Recent Decisions Highlight Splits in the Second Circuit, KLUWER ARB. BLOG
(July 10, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/07/10/section-1782discovery-recent-decisions-highlight-splits-in-the-second-circuit/
[https://perma.cc/KN4J-DK94] (archived July 16, 2020) (highlighting an interpretative
split within the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on the issues
of meaning of a foreign tribunal, extraterritorialapplication of the statute, and the role
of applicant delay); Sixth Circuit Approves Discovery in Aid of Foreign Private
2019),
(Oct.
7,
GUMP
AKIN
Arbitrations,
https://www.akingump.com/images/content/1/0/v2/109550/Sixth-Circuit-ApprovesDiscovery-in-Aid-of-Foreign-Private-Arbit.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9Y4-28V6] (archived
July 16, 2020) (explaining that the Sixth Circuit's decision to read 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to
allow discovery requests in relation to commercial arbitration procedures is in conflict
with previous decisions by the Second and Fifth Circuits).
13. See In re Hulley Enters., 358 F. Supp. 3d 331, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Tyler B.
Robinson, The Extraterritorial Reach of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in Aid of Foreign and
International Litigation and Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 135, 136-37 (2011)
(discussing some of the issues raised by parties and resolved by courts as to the
interpretation of vague words within the statute); LaFreniere, supra note 10 (discussing
a number of circuit court splits arising from diverging interpretations of the statute);
Sherman, supra note 12 (discussing a number of interpretative conflicts among lower
courts within the same circuit).
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This Note focuses on surveying cases to determine how different
courts have resolved the challenges presented by § 1782 while looking
for a possible solution to their divergence in exercising discretion under
the statute. To date, these cases have generated an intense debate
within the legal profession 14 due to a seeming departure from the
traditional liberal interpretation of § 1782 propitiated by Intel. This
debate is particularly important given the potential impact such
decisions have on multinational corporations.1 5 Section 1782 makes

US broad discovery rules and procedures available to foreign litigants
whose domestic litigation systems are often stricter or do not even
contemplate pretrial discovery.1 6 At the same time, access to US
discovery rules and procedures allows a larger number of lawsuits to
survive at the expense of the party producing the discovery (generally,
financial institutions and other large multinational corporations). 1 7

14. Interestingly, this issue seems to attract more discussion by active
practitioners working for law firms in transnational matters than by scholars. However,
judicial interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 has been highly criticized by a number of
scholars. See, e.g., Marat A. Massen, Discovery for Foreign Proceedings after Intel v.
Advanced Micro Devices: A CriticalAnalysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Jurisprudence,83 S.
CAL. L. REv. 875, 875 (2010) ("The Supreme Court's decision . . . in Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. has led district courts after Intel to render troubling and
inconsistent decisions on whether to grant requests for discovery for use in foreign
tribunals under 28 U.S.C. § 1782."); Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in
Foreign and InternationalTribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1, 1-2 (1998) [hereinafter Smit, American Assistance] ("All
too frequently, the development of considerable case law bears testimony to deficiencies
in statutory text. . . . [T]hat is not the case here. The statutory text is straightforward
and clear. The case law it has spawned has been caused by judicial unwillingness to give
it the meaning that an unbiased reading requires."); Deborah C. Sun, Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.: Putting ForeignBack into the ForeignDiscovery Statute,
39 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 279, 286 (2005) ("Different circuit courts have read into the statute
different requirements, none of which are mentioned in section 1782(a)'s plain
language.").
15. See Christopher J. Houpt & Mark G. Hanchet, Section 1782 Discovery: A Back
Door
for
Foreign
Litigants,
MAYER
BROWN
(Mar.
2012),
https://www. mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2012/03/section-

1782-discovery-a-back-door-for-foreign-lit [https://perma.cc/RX7F-3M4K] (archived July
17, 2020) (discussing the potential impact of a decision resolving a §1782 discovery
request in the context of a German securities fraud litigation on banks and financial
institutions).
16. See Stephan N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 306-07 (2002) ("[T]he number of discovery mechanisms available
to the American lawyers as a matter of right, the degree of party control over discovery,
the extent to which liberal discovery in the United States has become what almost looks
like a constitutional right, and the massive use of discovery of all kinds in a substantial
number of cases surely sets us apart.").
17. See George Shepherd, Still a Failure: Broad Pretrial Discovery and the

Superficial 2015 Amendments, 51 AKRON L. REV. 817, 822-23 (2017) ("[A] plaintiff can
commence a case with few, or no, facts in hand and instead attempt to gather facts during
the discovery process."); Houpt & Hanchet, supra note 15 ("A bank presented with a
Section 1782 discovery request faces an uncertain road. Compliance . . . can be
exceptionally expensive, require disclosure of sensitive or private information, and
possibly expose the entity to future liability.").
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The debate about the judiciary's inability to exercise discretion
homogenously in the context of § 1782 became once again relevant
after the Second Circuit issued its 2017 decision on Kiobel v. Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, LLP, reversing a district court's grant of a § 1782
discovery request seeking to reach confidential documents held by a
8
foreign party's counsel in the United States.1 In determining that the
district court abused its discretion by granting the request, the Second

Circuit reasoned that the Intel factors went against the petitioner and
also pondered "the respect owed to confidentiality orders, and the
9
concerns for lawyer-client relations."1 A year later, the Third Circuit

reversed a district court's decision quashing a subpoena issued
pursuant to

§ 1782 in a case with similar facts (In re Biomet

Orthopaedics Switzerland Gmbh), showing the courts inability to
reach an agreement as to the proper scope of § 1782 and how to
20
properly apply the Intel factors.
Another recent example of a controversy involving 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 is the Second Circuit's decision in In re del Valle Ruiz. 21 The
case presented a question regarding the extraterritorial reach of

§ 1782, in particular, whether the applicants could use a discovery
request in the Southern District of New York to reach documents

stored in Spain for use in a procedure in front of the Court of Justice of
the European Union. 22 In this instance, the court took a surprising
stance, distancing itself from the holding of a majority of the circuit's
lower courts and the court's own previous dicta by endorsing the

18. See generally Kiobel v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP, 895 F.3d 238 (2d Cir.
2017).
19. Id. at 248.
20. See LaFreniere, supra note 10 (discussing important differences in the
reasoning of the Cravath and Biomet cases). See generally In re Biomet Orthopaedics
Switz. GmbH, 742 F. App'x 690 (3d Cir. 2018).
21. See Alison Frankel, 2nd Circuit: Foreign Evidence Is Fair Game for 1782
Requests, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2019, 5:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc1782/2nd-circuit-foreign-evidence-is-fair-game-for-1782-requests-idUSKBN1WN2IP
[https://perma.ce/Q6Q3-CCVB] (archived July 17, 2020) (highlighting the relevance of
the Second Circuit's holding to foreign corporations); Gilbert A. Samberg, Second Circuit
Affirms the Extraterritorial Discovery Reach of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, NAT'L L. REV. (Nov. 4,
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/second-circuit-affirms-extraterritorial2019),
discovery-reach-28-usc-1782 [https://perma.cc/8H4V-TD2J] (archived July 17, 2020)
(discussing the court's reasoning of In re del Valle Ruiz). See generally In re del Valle
Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2019).
22. See In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 523-24 (providing an overview of the facts
of the case and affirming the lower court's decision to apply the statute
extraterritorially); In re Del Valle Ruiz, 342 F. Supp. 3d 448, 450-52, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (discussing the background of the case and concluding that grant of the application
is appropriate); Petitioners' Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Petitioners'
Application and Petition for an Order to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign
Proceedings Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 at 1-2, 4-6, In re Del Valle Ruiz, 342 F. Supp.
3d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:18-MC-00127), 2018 WL 2316093 (discussing the
extraterritoriality issue in depth and advancing the petitioner's position).
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Eleventh Circuit's reasoning underlying the 2016 Sergeeva v. Tripleton
InternationalLtd. decision.2 3

This Note argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 should be amended and
that judicial discretion in its application should be restricted in order
to afford aid to foreign-interested parties and tribunals in pursuance

of the provision's twin aims (increasing efficiency and encouraging
reciprocity) in every possible instance while establishing the necessary
safeguards to preserve the key features of the American adversarial
system. 24 Part II discusses the history and development of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782, as well as other related international commitments developed
in parallel to this provision. Part III then presents a range of circuit
courts' decisions, analyzes the proposed interpretative solutions put

forth by legal scholars, and assesses a variety of procedures followed
by other states' legal systems facing the foreign-discovery issue.
Finally, Part IV proposes a legislative amendment that aims to resolve
each of the existent interpretative disagreements.

II. THE ENACTMENT AND HISTORY OF 28 U.S.C. § 1782: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE PROVISION'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXT, AND
PURPOSE

A.

The Road to 28 U.S.C. § 1782

In 1855, Congress enacted its first act recognizing the need for
judicial assistance to foreign parties and tribunals under the title "An
Act to Prevent Mis-trials in the District and Circuit Courts of the
United States, in Certain Cases." 25 The statute's enactment occurred
after the federal government realized that it lacked a statutory grant
of power to execute letters rogatory-a court's request for assistance to

23. See In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 532-33 (endorsing the Eleventh Circuit's
previous holding accepting extraterritorial application of the statute). See generally
Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2016). For a more detailed
explanation of the Second Circuit's rationale leading to a departure from its previous
dicta in In re del Valle Ruiz, see infra Part III.A.
24. Eric D. McArthur, a renowned Supreme Court and appellate litigation
attorney, explains the importance of certain privileges to the maintenance of the
adversarial system as follows:
The [attorney-client] privilege reflects society's judgment that
effective legal representation is necessary to the administration of
justice in our adversarial system, that effective representation
requires "full and frank communication between attorneys and their
client," and that full and frank communication cannot be secured

without legal protection against compelled disclosure of the content
of attorney-client communications.
Eric D. McArthur, The Search and Seizure of Privileged Attorney-Client
Communications, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 731 (2005).
25. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630.
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26
a foreign court in the context of ongoing litigation -when a French

court requested assistance in obtaining testimony in connection with a
27
proceeding taking place in France. The Act provided:

[W]here letter rogatory shall have [been] addressed, from any court of a foreign
country to any circuit court of the United States, and a United States
commissioner designated by said circuit court to make the examination of
witnesses in said letter mentioned, said commissioner shall be empowered to
compel the witnesses to appear and depose in the same manner as to appear and
testify in court.

28

The 1855 Act was followed by "An Act to Facilitate the Taking of
Depositions within the United States, to be used in the Courts of other
Countries, and for other Purposes," which restricted the scope of
judicial aid in response to the submission of letters rogatory by
29
establishing new requirements. In particular, the Act established
that the testimony sought had to be used (1) "in any suit for the
recovery of money or property," (2) in a court "in any foreign country

with which the United States are at peace," and (3) "the government of
such foreign country shall be a party or shall have an interest" in the
proceeding. 30 In practice, these new requirements discouraged federal
courts from providing assistance in foreign proceedings.

31

It was not until 1948 that Congress moved towards a model
focused on providing broader means for judicial assistance to foreign
parties and courts, in line with the liberal spirit of the newly-enacted

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32 The Act "to Revise, Codify, and
Enact into Law Title 28 of the United States Code Entitled 'Judicial
Code and Judiciary' amended the Act of 1863, and codified it under 28
U.S.C. § 1782.33 Congress removed the requirement that a foreign

26. See TIMOTHY P. HARKNESS, RAHIM MOLOO, PATRICK OH & CHARLINE YIM,
DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 18-19 (2015).

27. See Jenna M. Godfrey, Americanization of Discovery: Why Statutory
Interpretation Bars 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)'s Application in Private International
Arbitration, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 475, 480 n.23 (2010) (discussing the context in which the
1855 statute was enacted).
10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE AND TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
28.
FROM DECEMBER 1, 1851, TO MARCH 3, 1855 630 (George Minot ed., 1855).

29.
30.

Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. 769.

31.

See Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and

Id.

a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 540-41 (1953) (discussing the consequences
following from the first amendment to the statute).
32. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1938, promoted "broad and
liberal discovery" in sharp contrast to prior practice. See Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments
of Discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REV. 205, 205 (1942)
(discussing the contributions the new rules made to the field and civil proceedings).
33. The 1948 version of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 stated:
The deposition of any witness residing within the United States
to be used in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country
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country be a party or have an interest in the proceeding, broadening
the provision's scope. 34 The reach of § 1782 further increased through
a 1949 amendment, which struck out the word "residing" and inserted
the words "judicial proceeding" in lieu of "civil action."35 Courts
understood the amendment's language as allowing judicial assistance
in both civil and criminal cases. 36
In 1958, Congress, responding to the significant growth of
international commerce, created the Commission on International
Rules of Judicial Procedure in order to increase the existing set of tools

available to obtain information and resolve disputes arising in foreign
jurisdictions. 37 The Commission's proposals, including a reform of
§ 1782, were accepted by Congress in 1964.38

The 1964 Amendment of

§ 1782 allowed courts not only to compel

depositions but also the production of documents and "other things." 39
The amendment further substituted the phrase "in any judicial
proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country" with "in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal," which opened the
provision to a larger number of proceedings, including "administrative
and quasi-judicial proceedings."40 These changes initiated the path

with which the United States is at peace may be taken before a person
authorized to administer oaths designated by the district court of any
district where the witness resides or may be found.
The practice and procedure in taking such depositions shall
conform generally to the practice and procedure for taking
depositions to be used in courts of the United States.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782, 62 Stat. 949 (emphasis added).
34. Compare Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. 769, with Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 646, § 1782, 62 Stat. 949. See generally Godfrey, supranote 27, at 481 (discussing the
changes brought by the 1948 and 1949 amendments).
35. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103.
36. See Jones, supra note 31, at 541-42 (discussing the contemporary
understanding of the changes made by the legislature).
37. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 248 (2004)
(discussing the creation of the Commission and the motivations that powered the
institution).
38. See Act of October 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, sec. 9, § 1782, 78 Stat. 995, 997.
39. See id; see also Smit, InternationalLitigation, supra note 1, at 1026 (explaining
how the statute operated after the 1964 amendment, and how such operation was
distinguishable from the previous form of the statute).
40. Compare Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782, 62 Stat. 949, and Act of May
24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103, with Act of October 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, sec.
9, § 1782, 78 Stat. 995, 997 (1964). The 1964 version of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 stated, in
relevant part:
§ 1782. Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to
litigants before such tribunals
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or
is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign
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towards a liberal interpretation of the scope of federal judicial

assistance in foreign proceedings and formed the courts' current
understanding of § 1782.41
The last amendment to

§ 1782 took place in 1996 when Congress

expressly added "including criminal investigations conducted before
formal accusation" to follow "foreign or international tribunal," leaving
the text of

§ 1782 (in relevant part) as follows:

(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other
thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including
criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order may be
made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or
international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may
direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing
be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue of his
appointment, the person appointed has power to administer any necessary oath
and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and
procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the
foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or
statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent that the order
does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the
document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

or international tribunal. The order may be made pursuant to a letter
rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international
tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may
direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or
other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By
virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has power to
administer any necessary oath and take the testimony or statement.
The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be
in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or
the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or
producing the document or other thing. To the extent that the order
does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be
taken, and the document or other thing procedure, in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or
statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any
legally applicable privilege.
§ 1782(a) (emphasis added). See also Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added)
(citing S. REP. NO. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1964); H.R. REP. NO. 1052, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., 9 (1963)) (discussing a variety of proceedings that would qualify as a tribunal
under the statute).
41. See Robert J. Augustine, Obtaining International Judicial Assistance Under
the Federal Rules and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
and Commercial Matters: An Exposition of the Procedures and a Practical Example: In
Re Westinghouse Uranium Contract Litigation, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101, 104 n.4
(1980) (comparing the Hague Evidence Convention to the statute and asserting that "the
judicial assistance statute . . . is much more liberal"); Hans Smit, Assistance Rendered
by the United States in Proceedings before International Tribunals, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
1264, 1266-67 (1962) [hereinafter Smit, Assistance Rendered] (advocating for further
liberalization of United States' assistance in connection with foreign proceedings).
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Procedure. A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or
to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable
privilege. 4 2

With this amendment, Congress increased once again the scope of
tribunals that could resort to

§ 1782.43 In particular, this amendment

resulted from a commitment to provide judicial assistance to the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and

Rwanda, after the United States implemented two United Nations
Security Council resolutions through "two international agreements
concerning the surrender of suspects" to these ad hoc tribunals in 1994

and 1995.44
B.

The Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention) and Other

Instruments for JudicialAssistance Incorporatedinto US Law.
Understanding the United States' international commitments in
matters of judicial cooperation is relevant to the interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1782 and its twin aims because these commitments set a floor
on US courts' obligations towards other states' judicial bodies.
Traditionally, a majority of states have agreed to provide judicial

assistance in foreign proceedings through the operation of letters
rogatory (civil and criminal procedures) and Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties (criminal procedures only).4 5 Therefore, in the absence of a
treaty or a statutory obligation, a court receiving a letter rogatory could
disregard the request.4 6

42. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018) (emphasis added); see also National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub L. 104-106, § 1342(b), 110 Stat. 486
(introducing the 1996 amendment).
43. See Godfrey, supra note 27, at 483 (discussing the effects of the 1996
amendment).
44. Robert Kushen & Kenneth J. Harris, Surrender of Fugitives by the United
States to the War Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 510,

510 (1996); see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 § 1342; G6ran
Sluiter, Obtaining Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: An Overview and Assessment of Domestic Implementing Legislation, 15

NETH. INT'L L. REV. 87, 93 n.30 (1998) (explaining that the United States was one of the
states enacting "legislation regulating the cooperation with . . . Ad Hoc Tribunals."); see
also id. at 101-02, 102 nn.77, 79 (conveying the flexibility of common law systems with
respect to "interstate legal assistance" and highlighting United States' policy of
accommodating "the practice and procedure of the international tribunal" in its
execution of legal assistance requests).
45. See generally T. MARKUS FUNK, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES AND
LETTERS RoGATORY: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 1 (2014) (describing the traditional means of

legal assistance between countries).
46. Augustine, supra note 41, at 115 (describing the procedure routinely followed
to obtain assistance of foreign authorities in situations in which a foreign witness is not
willing to participate voluntarily).
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In 1972, the United States ratified The Hague Conference of
Private International Law's Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention),

a treaty designed to "facilitate the transmission of Letters of Request
to improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial
and ...
matters."47 The Hague Evidence Convention sought to modernize and
improve previous rules (such as that introduced above), which provided

for a complicated method of judicial assistance through "letters of
request" and limited use of consuls. 48 Consequently, the Hague
Evidence Convention provided for the use of letters of request,
diplomatic and consular officers, and commissioners, as well as

established a mandatory floor for international assistance for the
signatories.

49

The United States Delegation understood Article 27 of the Hague
Evidence Convention to allow any country to "unilaterally offer by
internal law and practice, wider, broader, more liberal, and less

restrictive international assistance. Specifically, the free and open
system of assistance, available in the United States under 28 U.S.C.

§ §1781

50
and 1782 . . . remains unchanged and unrestricted."

Relatedly, the Supreme Court has reiterated the United States'
position that the Hague Evidence Convention is "neitherthe exclusive
nor the mandatory procedure for obtaining documents and information
in a foreign signatory's territory," in contravention to the assumption

by some contracting states that it is the only means for obtaining
51
discovery within the United States.

47. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
Commercial Matters, pmbl., June 1, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S.
into force Oct. 7, 1972) [hereinafter Hague Convention on the Taking
Abroad].
48. See Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session

in Civil or
231 (entered
of Evidence
of the Hague

Conference on Private International Law, 8 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIAL 785, 807 (1969)

[hereinafter Report on Eleventh Session of the Hague] (discussing the United States
government's view of the Hague Evidence Convention's goals).
49. See id. at 807-08 (enumerating the Convention's achievements); see also
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note 47, art. 27 ("The
provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from ...
permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than those
provided for in this Convention).
50. Report on Eleventh Session of the Hague, supra note 48, at 808.
51. See Societ6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 529 (1987); HARKNESS, MOLOO, OH & YIM, supra note 26, at
11 (2015) (discussing the United States' position as to whether the Hague Evidence
Convention is the exclusive means to obtain evidence from a foreign state). The
assumption by foreign sovereigns that the Hague Evidence Convention's procedures are
the only available channel for obtention of discovery in the United States is likely
motivated by their own approach to international cooperation in discovery matters. For
example, France has repeatedly argued that because the United States is a party to the
Hague Convention, parties to a litigation seeking evidence in the United States can only
use the request methods specifically provided for in the Convention. This posture stems
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Therefore, the preexisting statutory discovery cooperation regime
in the United States, which exceeds the international threshold
established by the Hague Evidence Convention, remains the main
source for foreign litigants to obtain discovery. However, the Hague
Evidence Convention acts as a complement to § 1782 by encouraging
reciprocity in the field of judicial assistance through the commitment
of the other signatories to a minimum level of cooperation when US
citizens or courts need to obtain discovery from a foreign jurisdiction. 5 2

C.

The Supreme Court's Interpretationof 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782: Intel

Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

In its Intel decision, the Supreme Court interpreted 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782(a) for the first time since the introduction of the key 1964 and
1996 amendments. 53 The case arose in the context of an antitrust
complaint filed at the Directorate-General for Competition of the

Commission of the European Communities (DG-Competition) by
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) against Intel Corporation (Intel Corp.),
promptly followed by a § 1782 discovery request in the US District
Court for the Northern District of California. 54 The district court
denied the request after interpreting that § 1782(a) did not allow the
production of the requested discovery; the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded. 5 5 Intel Corp. petitioned for certiorari, 56 and the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the issue in order to resolve an interpretative

from France's dislike of parties "importing" foreign evidence or trying to "export"
domestic evidence in its domestic judicial proceedings. See infra Part IV.A.
52. See HARKNESS, MOLoO, OH & YIM, supra note 26, at 8 (discussing the
background of the Hague Evidence Convention and its degree of success, as reflected by
number of ratifications).
53. See generally Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004);
Sun, supra note 14, at 282 ("The Supreme Court addressed the amended section 1782(a)
for the first time in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.").
54. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 246. The § 1782 request sought to obtain documents
that Intel Corp. had produced in the context of a private antitrust litigation in Alabama.
See Anan Suryakant Patel, InternationalJudicial Assistance: An Analysis of Intel v.
AMD and its Effects on § 1782 Discovery Assistance, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301, 302 (2006)
(providing a brief summary of the case's procedural history).

55.

See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 246.

56.

Intel Corp. argued, among other things, that "interested person" under §

1782(a) included only "litigants, foreign sovereigns, and the designated agents of those
sovereigns"; that the documents were not "for use in a foreign or international tribunal";
that the action at issue was not "pending or imminent"; and that granting a request was
conditional on the information being discoverable pursuant to the foreign jurisdiction's
rules

pursuant to

policy

concerns of avoiding

foreign government

offense

and

maintaining the litigants' parity. See Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, 23-24, 27-29, Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 524 U.S. 241 (2004) (No. 02-572), 2003 WL
23138394, at *19-23, *26, *27-33.
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conflict between circuit courts. 5 7 In particular, the court assessed "the
authority of federal district courts to assist in the production of
58
evidence for use in a foreign or international tribunal." After

examining the history of 28 U.S.C. § 1782,b9 the procedural
background of the case, 60 and the institutional character of the DGCompetition, the court engaged in a review of the plain text of the

statute, concluding that it authorized the federal district court to assist
AMD because the proceeding by the DG-Competition, although not
61
judicial in nature, led to a dispositive ruling and the DG-Competition
62
was, at minimum, a "quasi-judicial" agency. The Court further found
that § 1782 did not limit requests to pending or imminent procedures,
but instead required "only that a dispositive ruling . . . be within

reasonable contemplation." 63 The Court also determined that although
"comity and parity concerns" could be pondered in the district court's

exercise of discretion, they did not allow for a judicial "insertion of a
generally applicable foreign discoverability rule into the text of
§ 1782(a)." 64 Finally, the court provided a set of balancing factors for
district courts to use in their discretionary review of § 1782 discovery
requests. 65 These factors include:

57. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 253 (explaining that the Court decided to grant
certiorari in order to address a circuit court split regarding the interpretation of the
statute); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 540 U.S. 1003 (2003) (Mem.)
(granting certiorari); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (No. 02-572), 2002 WL 32151598 (petitioning for
certiorari and setting forth the questions presented).
58. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 246.
59. See supra Part II.A (describing the evolution of the statute at issue).
60. For a summary of the procedural background of this case, see Mousa Zalta,
Recent Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(A) by the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.: The Effects on Federal District Courts, Domestic Litigants,
and Foreign Tribunals and Litigants, 17 PACE INT'L L. REV. 413, 427 (2005)
(summarizing the content of the Court of Appeals' decision and its determination).
61. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 255-56 (quoting Smit, International Litigation,
supra note 1, at 1026) (holding that §1782(a) extends to parties "'possess[ing] a
reasonable interest in obtaining [judicial] assistance."').
62. See id. at 257-58.
63. Id. at 259.
64. Id. at 261. In rejecting Intel Corp.'s assertions that § 1782(a) did not require
an imminent or pending proceeding and did not have an implicit foreign discoverability
requirement, the court resolved interpretative issues that resulted in conflicting
decisions between circuit courts. See Zalta, supra note 60, at 429 (discussing the
implications of the decision with regard to interpretation of the statute). Before Intel,
there were three main interpretations of § 1782(a): (1) the First and Eleventh Circuits
required a prima facie finding of foreign discoverability in order to grant a request; (2)
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits also required a finding of foreign discoverability, except
when "the foreign tribunal itself was requesting evidence from a U.S. court"; and (3) the
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits rejected reading a foreign discoverability requirement
into the text of § 1782(a). See Massen, supra note 14, at 893-97 (summarizing the lower
courts' approaches to foreign discoverability).
65. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264 (providing four non-exhaustive factors to be
evaluated by courts in exercise of their discretion to grant discovery orders under § 1782).
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(1) whether the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the
foreign proceeding (because there is no need for U.S. judicial intervention where
the foreign tribunal itself can compel parties to produce evidence); (2) the nature
of the foreign tribunal and the character of the proceeding abroad, including
whether the foreign government or the court or agency is receptive to U.S. federal
court assistance; (3) whether the request is an attempt to circumvent proofgathering restrictions or policies in the foreign jurisdiction where the litigation
66
is pending; and (4) whether the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome.

The Court's decision to maintain lower courts' discretion in § 1782
by issuing a set of balancing factors, instead of "adopt[ing]
requirements barring or limiting section 1782(a) discovery," ultimately
led to the current interpretative disagreements. 67 Intel allows lower
courts to exercise their own judgment when parsing and considering

the facts surrounding a § 1782 request while broadening the scope of
two out of three statutory requirements necessary to invoke § 1782.68
Although the Court made its decision in an attempt to be consistent
with the "statute's text and its legislative history," it ultimately
resulted in "troubling or inconsistent decisions" by district courts that
have effectively frustrated the statute's twin goals of "fostering
international judicial cooperation and providing efficient resolutions of

foreign cases." 69

III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 AND INTEL

A.

ExtraterritorialApplication.

As previously introduced, the Intel decision solved a number of

interpretative conflicts while it left other issues unresolved. 70 Courts
continue to disagree on whether § 1782 authorizes domestic federal
courts to order a person "residing" or "found" in the United States to
produce documents within that person's possession, custody, or control

66. Developments in U.S. Law Regarding a More Liberal Approach to Discovery
Requests Made by Foreign Litigants Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (Apr.
2009),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2009/04/developments-in-us-lawregarding-a-more-liberal-approach-to-discovery-requests-made-by-foreign-litigantsunder-28-usc--1782 [https://perma.cc/WC3Z-XZ3K] (archived July 18, 2020).
67.

Sun, supra note 14, at 282 (analyzing the Court's reasoning and the ultimate

outcome of the case).
68. See Patel, supra note 54, at 304 (as a general matter, to qualify for assistance
under § 1782, a request must fulfill three main statutory requirements, namely, "(1) the
person from whom discovery is sought resides or is found in the district court's
jurisdiction, (2) the discovery is for use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal, and (3)
the application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or an interested person").
69.

Massen, supra note 14, at 875-76.

70. See supra Part I and notes 12-13 (introducing the main interpretative issues
and circuit splits in relation to the statute).
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71
that are located outside the United States. This issue has become

more contentious over the last two decades due to the proliferation of

73
internet-supported "servers"72 and "cloud computing" services that
allow domestic parties to have "possession, custody or control" over

documents that are stored in a computer or server located in a foreign
74
country.
The prevailing view among courts seems to be that § 1782 does not
75
authorize the discovery of documents abroad. The courts that have

found against the extraterritorial application of § 1782 have generally
based their decisions on three sources: (1) the published opinion of
Hans Smit, an expert in international law and civil procedure that
76
participated in the drafting of the statute; (2) a statement included

77
in a Senate Report from the time of drafting; and (3) dicta from the
78
The main argument against extraterritorial
Second Circuit.

application of the statute is that the statute's purpose is "to make

71. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV.
1119, 1177 & n.380 (2019) (discussing the courts disagreement as to whether the statute
can be applied extraterritoriality and comparing the issue to a similar one confronted by
the Federal Arbitration Act).
72. Servers are defined as computers in a network that are used to provide services
such as access to files to other computers. See server, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
(last visited Oct. 30, 2019)
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/server
[https://perma.cc/CM3K-68NP] (archived July 18, 2020).
73. Relatedly, cloud computing is "the practice of storing regularly used computed
data on multiple servers that can be access through the internet." Cloud computing,
https://www.merriamDICTIONARY,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
2019)
30,
Oct.
visited
(last
webster.com/dictionary/cloud%20computing
[https://perma.ccIY4J3-ZUUT] (archived July 18, 2020). See supra note 72 and
accompanying text (discussing the meaning of "server").
74. Robinson, supra note 13, at 136-37.
75. See, e.g., Kestrel Coal PTY, Ltd. v. Joy Global, Inc., 362 F.3d 401, 404 (7th Cir.
2004) (dictum) (seemingly supporting Smit's view that § 1782's reach does not extend to
information located outside of the United States, but declining to decide the issue); Four
Pillars Enters. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d 1075, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
support for the view that § 1782 does not encompass discovery located in other countries);
In re Nokia Corp., No. 107-MC-47, 2007 WL 1729664, at *5 (W.D. Mich. June 13, 2007)
(suggesting that the documents being located abroad weighted against granting a § 1782
request); Norex Petrol., Ltd. v. Chubbs Ins. Co. of Can., 384 F. Supp. 2d 45, 50-55 (D.D.C.
2005) (stating that case law suggests that extraterritorialapplication is inapplicable and
agreeing with the reasoning of the District Court for the Southern District of New York
and Second Circuit).
76. See Smit, American Assistance, supra note 14, at 10-12 (providing four reasons
why the statute should not be interpreted to apply extraterritorially).
77. See Kuwait Inv. Auth. v. Sarrio S.A. (In re Sarrio, S.A.), 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d
Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted) (citing S. REP. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788) ("[T]he district court relied in part on a Senate report asserting
that the amendments providing for documentary discovery under the statute were

intended to aid 'in obtaining oral and documentary evidence in the United States."').
78. See id. ("On its face, § 1782 does not limit its discovery power to documents
located in the United States. In finding such a limitation, the district court relied in part
on a Senate report .. . [and] policy concerns. . .. [T]here is reason to think that Congress
intended to reach only evidence located within the United States.").
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available to foreign and international tribunals and litigants evidence

to be obtained in the United States," not to allow foreign litigants to
obtain evidence located abroad that they could not have obtained
through their domestic proceedings. 79
However, the Eleventh Circuit departed from other circuit courts'
dictum 80 when it held that § 1782 applies extraterritorially in Sergeeva
v. Tripleton InternationalLtd. (Sergeeva)8 1 and Fuhr v. Credit Suisse

AG (Fuhr).82 In Sergeeva, the appellant, a "corporate administration

services 8 3 company called Trident Corporate Services (Trident),
sought a decision reversing the district court's pronouncement
granting a § 1782 request against the organization. 84 Trident opposed
the request because it contended that the documents required were

located outside the United States and in the possession of a third
party.8 5 The corporation further argued that the district court should
have
applied the
judicial
canon
of presumption
against
extraterritoriality 86 when it interpreted § 1782's scope, which in turn
would prevent requests based on that statute from reaching documents

located outside of the United States. 87 The court rejected the argument
and stated that § 1782 should be interpreted "in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 88 More explicitly, the court
determined that Rule 45, which requires parties to produce

79. Smit, American Assistance, supra note 14, at 11.
80. Kestrel Coal, 362 F.3d at 404; Four Pillars Enters., 308 F.3d at 1079; Norex
Petrol., 384 F. Supp. 2d at 50-55.
81. See Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194, 1199-200 (11th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the extraterritorial location of stored information is "not a per se bar to
discovery under § 1782").
82. Fuhr v. Credit Suisse AG, 687 F. App'x 810, 816 n.8 (11th Cir. 2017).
83. Although Trident Corporate Services, Inc. defines itself as a provider of "a full
range of fund accounting and administration services," the district court made findings
that the company had in fact assisted Dubin, Sergeeva's former husband, with
transferring marital estate property to a number of off-shore companies incorporated in
the British Virgin Islands and Bahamas. See In re Sergeeva, No. 1:13-CV-3437-LMMRGV, 2015 WL 12862925, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2015), aff'd sub nom. Sergeeva v.
Tripleton
Int'l
Ltd.,
834
F.3d
1194;
TRIDENT
TRUST,
https://tridenttrust.com/locations/united-states-atlanta/

(last visited July

18,

2020)

[https://perma.cc/GJG5-YTMT] (archived July 18, 2020).
84. Sergeeva, 834 F.3d at 1197-98.
85. See id. at 1197.
86. Id. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a long-standing canon of
construction that holds that in case of doubt, a statute should be construed "as intended
to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker
has general and legitimate power." This understanding is a byproduct of the universally
accepted rule that an act's characterization as lawful or unlawful should be made by the
laws of the jurisdiction where an act is committed. See American Banana Co. v. United

Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909); William S. Dodge, Understanding the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 85 (1998)
(summarizing the Court's view of the presumption of extraterritoriality in American
Banana).
87. See Sergeeva, 834 F.3d at 1200.
88. Id.
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electronically stored information and draws geographical limitations

with a basis on the place of production, was relevant to the
interpretation of § 1782.89 Therefore, since Trident's "residence" was in
Atlanta (that is, Atlanta was the place of discovery production), it was

irrelevant that the documents sought were stored outside of the United
90
States' territory.
In Fuhr, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a district court's grant of

an applicant's request to obtain evidence from a financial corporation

the court "lacked the power to compel production of documents ..

.

91
in order to defend himself in a German defamation lawsuit. Although
the court reversed the order, finding for the financial entity for
separate reasons, it plainly rejected the corporation's argument that

because the documents were located abroad" and reasserted its holding

in Sergeeva. 92
These Eleventh Circuit's decisions were in complete opposition to
the assertions made by several other courts, 93 most notably, the
94
However, this
Second Circuit's pronouncement in In re Sarrio.
conflict might soon result in the Eleventh Circuit's view on
extraterritorial application becoming controlling. 9 5 In October 2019,

the Second Circuit explicitly addressed this topic for the first time and
resolved the longstanding split among its district courts with respect
to the extraterritoriality issue by holding that "a district court is not

categorically barred from allowing discovery under § 1782 of evidence
located abroad."9 6
In In re del Valle Ruiz, the Second Circuit reviewed a decision by
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granting
a § 1782 request against Santander Investment Securities Inc. (SIS), a

89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii), (c)(2)(A) ("A subpoena may command ...
production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things at a place
within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts
business in person[.]"); Sergeeva, 834 F.3d at 1200.
90. See Sergeeva, 834 F.3d at 1200 ("[T]he District Court could require that Trident
Atlanta produce responsive documents and information located outside the United
States-so long as Trident Atlanta had possession, custody, or control of such responsive
material.").
91. See Fuhr v. Credit Suisse AG, 687 F. App'x 810, 811 (11th Cir. 2017).
92. See id. at 816 n.8.
93. See Bookman, supra note 71, at 1177 n.380 (referencing a number of opinions
by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York holding that § 1782 does
not apply extraterritorially); see also In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 532 n.16 (2d Cir.
2019) (citing Kuwait Inv. Auth. v. Sarrio S.A. (In re Sarrio, S.A.), 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d
Cir. 1997)) ("Most courts that have concluded that § 1782 does not apply
extraterritorially rely on dicta from this Court, a contemporaneous Senate report, and a
1998 article by one of § 1782's principal drafters.").
94. Compare Sergeeva, 834 F.3d at 1194-202, with Kuwait Inv. Auth. v. Sarrio
S.A. (In re Sarrio, S.A.), 119 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 1997) (respecting the lower court's
holding that § 1782 does not reach discovery located abroad).
95. Compare In re Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d at 143-48, with In re del Valle Ruiz, 939
F.3d at 520-34.
96. In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 533 (emphasis added).
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US-based affiliate of Spanish financial entity Banco Santander
(Santander).9 7 In the initial action, the district court granted the

request despite Santander's assertion that the presumption against
extraterritoriality functions as a bar against discovery of evidence

located in a foreign country under § 1782.98 The Second Circuit rejected
Santander's argument under the premise that the statute at issue does
not recognize a cause of action, directly regulate conduct, or allow for
relief (i.e., it is a jurisdictional statute) and the Supreme Court has
never applied this canon of construction to a "strictly jurisdictional"
statute. 99 Furthermore, the court found support for its decision on the
Eleventh Circuit's reasoning invoking the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.1 00
However, although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted

the Eleventh Circuit's position and distanced itself from what seemed
to be its previous view against extraterritoriality,101 it did so with the

qualification that courts "may properly, and in fact should, consider the
location of documents and other evidence" when exercising their
discretionary power.' 0 2 Although the other circuits still have to
respond to this interpretative change by the Second Circuit, it is now a

possibility that one of the main interpretative hurdles of § 1782 will be
solved without the assistance of the Supreme Court or the
legislature.1 0 3
B.

The Meaning of "Foreignor InternationalTribunals"

The importance of international business transactions and the
popularization of alternative methods of dispute resolution has
presented another important issue: whether § 1782's reference to
"foreign or international tribunals" is intended to encompass not only
traditional judicial bodies but also ad hoc and private international

97. Id. at 523.
98. Id. at 531.
99. Id. at 532 (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100-01
(2016)); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013)).
100. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (summarizing the Eleventh
Circuit's position as to the extraterritoriality issue).

101. See Kuwait Inv. Auth. v. Sarrio S.A. (In re Sarrio, S.A.), 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d
Cir. 1997) ("[T]here is reason to think that Congress intended [the statute] to reach only
evidence located within the United States.").
102. In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 533 ("Our previous dicta notwithstanding,
we join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that a district court is not categorically barred
from allowing discovery under § 1782 of evidence located abroad.").
103. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the
Supreme Court-and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 804 (2010) (discussing how the
Supreme Court could learn from the Federal Circuit's methods to review district court
cases and criticizing the Supreme Court's "failure to provide clear analytical directions,"
which in turn causes its docket to fill with interpretative clashes).
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104
The scope of the phrase "foreign or
arbitration panels and tribunals.
international tribunals" is a particularly longstanding § 1782
question. 10 5 However, disagreement among appellate courts did not
occur until 2019.106
On one side, the Second Circuit issued its leading decision

National BroadcastingCo. v. Bear Stearns & Co. in 1999, holding that
§ 1782 does not apply to "an arbitral body established by private
parties." 10 7 National Broadcastinginvolved a dispute between NBC
and Azteca, a Mexican broadcasting company. The dispute revolved
around the parties' programming and services agreement, which
included a provision mandating resolution of disputes through
arbitration in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) under
108
In anticipation of an arbitration
ICC rules and Mexican law.
proceeding pursuant to the agreement, NBC submitted a § 1782
subpoena application, which was quashed by the lower court due to the

109
The issue went on
nature of the dispute-resolution procedure.
appeal, where the court answered the question of whether the ICC was
a "foreign or international tribunal" within the meaning of the
statute. 110 In reaching its decision, the court looked at the language of

104. See Laura Emmy Malament, Making or Breaking Your Billion Dollar Case:
U.S. JudicialAssistance to PrivateInternationalArbitration under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a),
67 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1214 (2014) (highlighting the increasing importance of
arbitration as a method to resolve disputes).
105. Hans Smit, an international law expert, first discussed this issue in 1965. See
supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (discussing Hans Smit's role in the drafting
of 28 U.S.C. § 1782); see also Arthur W. Rovine, Topic in Transnational Litigation:
Section 1782 and InternationalArbitral Tribunals: Some Key Considerations in Key
Cases, 23 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 461, 461-62 (2012) (emphasis omitted) (citing Hans Smit,
InternationalLitigation, supra note 1, at 1021) ('[T]ribunal encompasses all bodies that
have adjudicatory power, and is intended to include . . . arbitral tribunals or single
arbitrators."').
106. Although § 1782's arbitration dilemma has been widely discussed by scholars
for the last fifty-some years, it has not been addressed by courts until relatively recently.
Before 2019, only two courts of appeals (for the Second and Fifth Circuit) had pronounced
about the issue, both reaching the same outcome. In 2019, the Sixth Court issued an
opposing interpretation to the then-uniform stance. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co.
v. FedEx Corp., 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019).
107. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d. Cir. 1999). Note
that the Second Circuit's decision was issued before Intel, which is problematic because
Intel explicitly discussed the nature of tribunals that would qualify for the assistance
provided by § 1782. Id. But see In re Chevron Corp., No. M-19-111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47034, at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010) (memorandum opinion) (rejecting respondents'
argument relying on Nat'l Broad. Co. because the arbitration at issue was pending in a
tribunal established by a bilateral investment treaty and pursuant to UNCITRAL rules
and invoking dictum from Intel in support of the position that, at a minimum,
international arbitral bodies under UNCITRAL are tribunals within the meaning of the
statute).
108. See Bear Stearns, 165 F.3d at 186.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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the statute,11 1 its legislative history,1 12 and policy reasons surrounding
the existence of arbitration and the use of discovery.11 3 The court relied

mainly on the silence of

§ 1782's legislative history to determine that

the expression "foreign and international tribunal" did not encompass
private tribunals.11 4 This narrow interpretation of the word "tribunal"

was soon adopted by the Fifth Circuit 1 15 and has received at least some
support from the lower courts of the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and

Eleventh Circuits.116
On the other side, the Sixth Circuit recently issued its decision in
Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp., criticizing the
reasoning of the Second and Fifth Circuits1"7 and holding that the
DIFC-LCIA118 Arbitration Centre is a tribunal within the meaning of

the statute because "the text, context, and structure of

§ 1782(a)

provide no reason to doubt that the word 'tribunal' includes private

commercial arbitral panels established pursuant to contract and

111. See id. at 188 (determining the term "foreign or international tribunals" to be
undefined and looking at "its ordinary or natural meaning").
112. See id. at 188-90 (determining that although it is clear that the 1964
amendment to the statute sought to broaden its scope to include "governmental or
intergovernmental arbitral tribunals," it did not clearly intend to reach private
international tribunals).
113. See id. at 190-91 (discussing the characteristics making arbitration an
attractive method of conflict resolution and how those features were at odds with the
concept of "broad-ranging discovery" made possible pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
114. See id. at 190 ("[W]e are confident that a significant congressional expansion
of American judicial assistance to international arbitral panels created exclusively by
private parties would not have been lightly undertaken by Congress without at least a
mention of this legislative intention.").
115. See Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir.
1999) ("[W]e elect to follow the Second Circuit's recent decision that § 1782 does not apply
to private international arbitration.").
116. See In re Operadora DB Mex., S.A., No. 6:09-cv-383-Orl-22GJK, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 68091, at *28-29 (M. D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2009) (holding that "Congress did not
clearly intend to include private arbitral proceedings within the ambit of 'foreign or
international tribunals."'); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Gen. Sec. Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882,
884 (N. D. Ill. 2009) (following the Second and Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the statute
after noting that the Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed the issue); In re Grupo
Unidos por el Canal S.A., No. 14-mc-80277-JST (DMR), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52358, at
*24-25 (N. D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015) (holding that "private arbitrations ... do not fall within
the meaning of 'tribunal'"); In re Grupo Unidos Por El Canal, S.A., No. 14-mc-00226MSK-KMT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50910, at *22-23 (D. Colo. Apr. 17, 2015) (holding
that a private arbitration tribunal is not a § 1782 tribunal).
117. See Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp., 939 F.3d 710, 726 (6th
Cir. 2019) ("[W]e believe the Second and Fifth Circuits turned to legislative history too
early in the [statutory] interpretation process.").
118. DIFC-LCIA is the acronym for the Dubai International Financial CentreLondon Court of International Arbitration, an arbitration center established as the
result of the cooperation of the United Arab Emirates and the London Court of
International Arbitration, with an aim to become a regional hub for dispute resolution.
See generally DIFC-LCIA ARB. CTR., http://www.dife-lcia.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/FKN6-VHD9] (archived July 19, 2020) (introducing the role of DFICLCIA).
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19
having the authority to issue decisions that bind the parties."1 The
dispute in Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. arose after ALJ, a Saudi Arabia-

incorporated transportation company, entered into a "General Service
Provider" contract with FedEx International to provide international
20
Pursuant to the contract, the
delivery services in Saudi Arabia.1
parties agreed to resolve any disputes through mandatory arbitration

in Dubai under the rules of the DIFC-LCIA.1 21 When a dispute arose,
FedEx commenced arbitration against ALJ pursuant to the contract
provisions, and ALJ filed an § 1782(a) application for discovery in the
22
The
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.1
district court denied the application after determining that the DIFC23
LCIA Arbitration panel was not a "foreign or international tribunal."1
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the issue de novo, engaging in

statutory interpretation of § 1782.124 The court explained that since
there was no statutory definition readily available to interpret the
meaning of "foreign or international tribunal," it was necessary to look
at the language of the statute, giving its words their ordinary meaning
at the time of enactment, as revealed by dictionaries and, if necessary,
other evidence of usage (including the use of the word in legal writing

and by courts, the statutory context, and the overall statutory
scheme).1 25 After

determining

that

dictionaries

left

"room

for

interpretation" as to the meaning of "tribunal,"126 the court turned to
other relevant usages of the word and found that legal scholars,127,
30
29
state courts,1 28 the Sixth Circuit itself,1 and the Supreme Court
had all used the word "tribunal" in some occasion to refer to private
arbitration. The court further examined the statute's surrounding
language and a related provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1781, and
determined that the legal framework surrounding § 1782 did not

119. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 723.
120. See id. at 714.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 715-16.
123. See id. at 716.
124. See id. at 717.
125. See id. at 717-18.
126. See id. at 719-20 (discussing the definition of tribunal of a variety of legal
dictionaries and non-legal sources and determine the results inconclusive).
127. See id. at 720 (introducing the work of Justice Joseph Story, and in particular
his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, as an example of usage of the word tribunal
in connection to private arbitration).
128. See id. at 721 (highlighting a number of cases in which the Supreme Courts
of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Tennessee, among others, referred
arbitration panels as tribunals).

to private

129. See id. (citing Toledo Steamship Co. v. Zenith Transportation Co., 184 F. 391,
400 (6th Cir. 1911)).
130. See id. at 721-22 (explaining that the Supreme Court has referred to private
arbitral bodies as tribunals both before and after the current language of § 1782 was
enacted, which signals that the courts' understanding of the word tribunal has been
uniform throughout time).
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provide any reasons against reading "tribunal" to encompass private,
contracted-for arbitration panels.1 31 Finally, the court supported its
decision with dictum from the Supreme Court's Intel decision

suggesting that "tribunal," as read in the statute, extended to nonjudicial proceedings and non-judicial arbitral authorities.1 32
The aforementioned cases are incredibly interesting because the

courts interpreted the exact same sources and came to conflicting
interpretations, which ultimately led to opposing outcomes in the
underlying cases.1 33 This conflict reflects the troublesome result of the
current language of § 1782 and the subsequent body of decisions
interpreting it: applications with a similar factual background have
widely divergent chances of success depending on the jurisdiction
where the respondent resides or is found. However, although the

decision issued by the Sixth Circuit effectively creates a circuit split as
to the interpretation of "foreign or international tribunal" within
§ 1782, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will intervene to resolve
this challenge given that it already hinted its stance in the Intel
decision.1 34
C.

Impact of Applicant Delay

An additional source of uncertainty in the interpretation of § 1782
appeared as a result of the courts' interpretation of the Intel opinion,
and more particularly, of the courts' exercise of discretion by taking
into account circumstances not expressly set forth by-but related to-

the Intel factors.1 3 5 This approach is justified by a widely held
understanding that

§ 1782 is to be interpreted in accordance with the

131. See id. at 723.
132. See id. at 724-25 (discussing the Supreme Court's approving reference in Intel
to a Senate Report contemporaneous to the statute, the work of Hans Smit, and the
amicus brief of the Commission, all of which alluded to non-judicial tribunals).
133. Compare Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184 (2d. Cir. 1999),
with Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co., 939 F.3d at 710-32.
134. See John B. Pinney, In InternationalArbitration, PartiesMay Be Entitled to
U.S. Discovery, AM. B. Ass'N: ALT. DIsP. RESOL. PRAC. POINTS (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/alternative-disputeresolution/practice/2019/in-international-arbitration-parties-may-be-entitled-to-usdiscovery/ [https://perma.cc/C32M-7JVQ] (archived July 19, 2020) (stating that although
the circuit split could eventually lead to the Supreme Court revisiting the issue, it is
more likely that the Sixth Circuit's position prevail). But see Ted Folkman, Case of the
Day: Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation v. FedEx, LETTERS BLOGATORY: BLOG OF INT'L

JUD. AsSISTANcE (Sept. 24, 2019), https://lettersblogatory.com/2019/09/24/case-of-theday-abdul-latif-jameel-transportation-v-fedex/ [https://perma.cc/VPQ5-78GF] (archived
July 19, 2020) (asserting that this issue could be granted certiorari depending on the
outcome of a similar case currently being heard on the Second Circuit). For a general
discussion of the Supreme Court's tendency to revisit is own decisions, see Christopher
P. McMillion & Kevin Vance, Criticism from Below: The Supreme Court's Decision to
Revisit Cases, 5 J.L. & CTs., 81, 82-83 (discussing the negative effects of case-revisiting
in the rule of law).

135.

See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264-65 (2004).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 136 Specifically, Rule 26 gives courts
broad discretion in the supervision of discovery and resolution of
discovery disputes.1 37 Therefore, some courts interpret Intel's reading
of § 1782 as giving courts discretion to deny a discovery request even if

the

Intel

factors

circumstances.1

have

been

fulfilled,

based

on

extraneous

38

In particular, the Second Circuit has repeatedly expressed that
the untimeliness of a request strongly counsels against providing
assistance.1 39 In support of its position, the Second Circuit has argued
that granting an "inexcusable untimely" request would injure the twin

aims of the statute because such a request fails to provide an "efficient
means of assistance to the foreign proceeding."1 40 The Second Circuit's
courts have further argued that this interpretation goes hand in hand
with the fourth Intel requirement (burdensomeness of fulfilling a

request) because "the longer the delay in seeking documents, the
greater burden is imposed on parties expected to respond to the
documents requests."1 4 ' The impact of delay has become quite relevant
to the discretionary analysis of lower courts, with some recent decisions

136. See, e.g., In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Malev Hungarian
Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1992); In re 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 249 F.R.D. 96, 106
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("The proper scope of discovery sought under section 1782, like all
federal discovery, is governed by Federal Rule 26(b).").
137. See Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482
U.S. 522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (mentioning the "broad discretion our
courts normally exercise in managing pretrial discovery").

138.

See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264 ("[A] district court is not required to grant a

§ 1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the authority to do so."); In re
Hulley Enters., 358 F. Supp. 3d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Kiobel v. Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, LLP, 895 F.3d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 2018)) (alteration in original) (internal
citation omitted) ("To guide district courts in the decision to grant a Section 1782
petition, the Supreme Court ... discussed non-exclusive factors (the 'Intel factors') to be
considered in light of the 'twin aims' of Section 1782."); see also Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at
266 (mentioning the ability of district courts to control discovery under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
139. See Nascimento v. Faria, 600 F. App'x 811, 812 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary
order); In re Nascimento, No. 14 Misc 0020, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71212, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2014) (using the court's discretionary power to quash a subpoena due
to the untimeliness of the request); see also Aventis Pharma v. Wyeth, No. M-19-70, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105422 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2009) (denying an application because the
applicant did not attempt to obtain the documents through a foreign court that could
reach them, despite being involved in a 5-year long litigation in that court). But see In re
ALB-GOLD Teigwaren GmbH, No. 19-mc-1166 (MKB) (ST), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
148595, at *33-35 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (holding that a filing delay of six months
since the conclusion of an arbitration does not render the application untimely to the
point of injuring the twin aims of §1782).
140. See Nascimento, 600 F. App'x at 812 (citing Brandi-Dohrn v. IKB Deutsche
Industriebank AG, 673 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2012)) ("District courts must exercise their
discretion under [Section] 1782 in light of the twin aims of the statute .... ") (internal
quotation marks omitted); In re Hulley Enters., 358 F. Supp. 3d. at 351 (internal citations
omitted).
141. See In re Hulley Enters., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 351-52.
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listing it as a separate, identifiable factor in addition to the traditional
Intel statutory plus four-factor analysis.1 4 2

The position of the Second Circuit was recently emphasized in In
re Hulley.143 This case involves a series of disputes between the former
shareholders of Yukon, a Russian oil and gas company, and the
Russian government arising from an alleged expropriation of the
corporation.1 4 4 After the Russian government raised a defense of
"unclean hands"14 5 against a foreign arbitral panel's initial
determination finding the Russian government's practice tantamount

to a creeping expropriation, the shareholders filed a § 1782 request to
obtain information from White & Case, formerly representing the oil
company and currently representing the Russian government in a
variety of related matters.14 6 The court reviewing the request
recognized that it met the requirements set by the four Intel factors.
Nonetheless, it denied the discovery and subpoena requests based on
consideration of non-Intel discretionary factors, giving special weight

to the shareholders' delay in filing the application.14 7
In addition to the Second Circuit, the lower courts of the Seventh
Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit have issued opinions
supporting this view. 148 At this time, no courts have expressly

142. See id. at 348-52 (inserting a lengthy delay analysis between the third and
fourth Intel factors); see also In re ALB-GOLD Teigwaren, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148595,
at *33-35. Other states' courts have also declared that untimeliness can lead to denial
of a request. See, e.g., TJAC Waterloo, LLC ex. rel. Univ. of Notre Dame (USA) in Eng.,
No. 3:16-mc-9-CAN, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56381, at *6-7 (N.D. In. Apr. 27, 2016) ("Even
if jurisdiction existed, however, TJAC's application for discovery is untimely and
irrelevant.").
143. In re Hulley Enters., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 331.
144. See id. at 334-36.
145. The Russian Government's defense alleged that even if the acquisition of
Yukon by the government was in effect a creeping expropriation: the shareholders were
not entitled to damages because Yukon's privatization and the shareholders' acquisition
of shares in the corporation occurred through dubious methods, including bribes to public
officials. See id. at 336-37.
146. See id. at 336-39. For a definition of "creeping expropriation," see Creeping
Expropriation, FREE DIcTIONARY BY FARLEX: FIN. DICTIONARY, https://financialdictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Creeping+expropriation#:-:text=changes%20in%201a

w.-,Creeping%20Expropriation,or%20business%20to%20own%20property (last visited
July 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/GWU9-U9M8] (archived July 16, 2020) ("The continual
restriction of private property rights gradually over time by a government. . .").
147. See In re Hulley Enters., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 345-52; see also J. Alexander
Lawrence, U.S. Courts Continue Reluctance Toward Foreign Discovery, LAW360 (Sept.
25,
2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1202270/us-courts-continue-reluctance-

toward-foreign-discovery [https://perma.cc/7M37-DVBK] (archived July 19, 2020)
(discussing the details of the Hulley case and the court's reasoning).
148. See TJAC Waterloo, LLC ex. rel. Univ. of Notre Dame, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
56381, at *6-8 (using the court's discretion to deem the § 1782 discovery request
untimely and irrelevant because the petitioner litigated the issue for sixteen months
before attempting to file the request); In re Caratube Int'l Oil Co., 730 F. Supp. 2d 101,
107 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the petitioner's lack of justification on its delay in filing
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pronounced against a court's ability to consider undue delay when
deciding a § 1782 request. Consequently, although there is an
increasing trend towards pondering delay as a factor against granting
§ 1782 applications, it is unclear whether the Second Circuit's

reasoning will actually be embraced or adopted by other appellate
courts.14 9
D.

Courts'Ability to Compel Production of Confidential Documents

in Possession of Third Parties, Including US Legal Counsel.
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) states that "[a] person may not be compelled
to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other
thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege." The courts have

engaged in some analysis as to the scope of this statement and the
meaning of "privilege," and seem to have taken a broad view of the
issue.1 50 However, courts still dispute whether a § 1782 applicant has
the ability to obtain information, typically of a confidential nature,

from a foreign party's US counsel.151 This issue has recurrently been
framed by parties as a jurisdictional matter (that is, as part of Intel's
52
initial statutory analysis)1 -tied

to

§ 1782's statutory requirement

that "the person from whom discovery is sought resides or is found in
53
the district of the district court to which application is made"1 -but

the petition supported denying the petition); In re Digitechnic, No. C07-414-JCC, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33708, at *14 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2007) (holding a § 1782 request
unduly burdensome due to the petitioner's "complete failure to justify the [delayed]
timing of the request").
149. See Lawrence, supra note 147 (discussing the impact of § 1782 applications
on U.S.-based law firms through the facts of In re Hulley).
150. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing
the journalist privilege); United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.
2001) (discussing the work-product doctrine); Al Fayed v. United States, 229 F.3d 421
(4th Cir. 2000) (discussing the national security privilege); Chevron v. Shefftz, 754 F.
Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass. 2010) (discussing the attorney-client privilege); In re Vega, 746
F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2010) (discussing foreign privileges).
151. See, e.g., LaFreniere, supra note 10 (discussing the problems underlying the
current wording of the statute and addressing the Cravath and Biomet decisions).
152. See, for example, Cravath's formulation of the disputed issue:
Since jurisdiction under Section 1782 is subject to established
limits on federal courts' power to compel production of privileged
materials, a district court cannot order a law firm to produce client
documents that would fall beyond the statutory reach of a subpoena
if the documents had instead been maintained by the client.
Kiobel v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP, 895 F.3d 238, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2017).
153. Cravath found support for this argument in precedent discussing the
extension of privileges and protections (provided by a court to a party) to its counsel.
This Court should not allow litigants to circumvent Section
1782's jurisdictional limitations so easily. Under longstanding
precedent, documents that are beyond a court's subpoena power in a
client's hands retain their protection from judicial process when they
are transferred to an attorney for purposes of obtaining legal advice.
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courts have disregarded such framing and have opted for disposing of
the issue as part of the independent, discretionary authority of the
court in adjudicating § 1782 requests.1 54

The Second Circuit has taken the position that "an order
compelling American counsel to deliver documents that would not be

discoverable abroad, and that are in counsel's hands solely because
they were sent to the United States for the purpose of American
litigation," should not be granted because of several reasons.1 55 First,
when a party is seeking materials from a US-based law firm to use in
foreign litigation against the firm's client, the real party from whom
the documents are sought is indeed the client, not the US-based law

firm.1 56 Intel's first factor (whether the applicant is one of the parties
to the foreign proceeding) makes clear that "when the person from
whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding, the

need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as ...

when evidence

is sought from a nonparticipant."1 57 Second, in certain occasions, a
party's § 1782 request is merely an attempt to avoid a foreign forum's
more cumbersome or more restrictive procedure, which might
contravene Intel's third factor (circumvention of domestic proofgathering restrictions or public policies).1 58 Additionally, the court

considers other "pertinent issues arising from the facts of the
particular dispute."1 59
An example of additional considerations that a court might
entertain can be found in Kiobel v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP.1 6 0
In this case, the applicant filed a petition to obtain documents from the
foreign defendant's US counsel for use in litigation in The
Netherlands.1 61 The documents requested were related to prior

That precedent . . . is fatal to Kiobel's petition: Because Shell is not
within the District Court's subpoena power, its documents cannot be
compelled from its attorney, Cravath.
Brief for Respondent-Appellant Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP at 1, Kiobel v.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP, 895 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 17-424-cv), 2017 WL
1373526, at *3.
154. See In re Biomet Orthopaedics Switz. GmbH, 742 F. App'x 690, 696 (3d Cir.
2018); Cravath, 895 F.3d at 244 (rejecting respondents' contention that a law firm's
representation of a foreign client is a jurisdictional matter).
155. See Cravath, 895 F.3d at 241 (making an express reference to the fact that
the documents were potentially not discoverable in the litigation forum, despite the
Intel's court reluctance to reading a foreign-discoverability rule into § 1782); Intel Corp.
v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 253 (2004) ("We now hold that § 1782(a)
does not impose such a [foreign-discoverability] requirement.").
156. See Cravath, 895 F.3d at 245.
157. Intel Corp., 524 U.S. at 264.
158. For example, in Cravath, Kiobel's counsel stated that Dutch procedural rules
provided a procedure to request the documents sought in American court, but that it was
"hardly possible for a party to obtain evidence from another party pre-trial." See Cravath,
895 F.3d at 245 n.3.
159. Id. at 245.
160. Id. at 238-48.
161. See id. at 240-41.
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litigation the petitioner had commenced in the United States against

that same defendant and were protected as confidential under a court
62
In this case, the
order that limited their use to the United States.1
court accounted for the importance of protecting attorney-client

communications and relations, the existence of more restrictive
discovery procedures in the Netherlands, and the respect owed to
63
The court
confidentiality orders in denying the § 1782 request.1
placed particular weight on the principle that "when a client is

privileged from producing documents, so too is the client's counsel,"
which derives from the American legal system's overarching goal to
encourage "open communications between lawyers and their
clients."1 64 A second case, In re Effecten-Spiegel AG, pondered instead
the relationship between the nonparticipant from which the
information was being requested and the defendant (finding relevant
that the nonparticipant was a corporate affiliate of the applicant's
adversary), as well as the lack of significant connections between
another nonparticipant and the events at issue in litigation (in other
words, § 1782 cannot be used as a "fishing expedition" tool), finding
5
these circumstances to weigh against issuing a discovery order.16 In
particular, the court emphasized the importance of respecting

corporations' separate corporate identities and the unlikelihood that
66
the discovery sought was available to the nonparticipants.1

Overall, the Second Circuit's analysis seems at least partially at
odds with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute, which
made clear that although § 1782 "expressly shields privileged
material," it does not limit a court's "production-order authority" solely
to documents and materials that would be otherwise discoverable in
67
the foreign jurisdiction.1
Additionally, the Third Circuit's reasoning in In re Biomet

Orthopaedics Switzerland GmbH, shows a different understanding of
Intel's first (nature of the parties) and third (circumvention of domestic

proof-gathering restrictions or public policies) factors as they relate to

162. See id. at 241. The previous litigation in the United States ultimately resulted
in a well-known Supreme Court decision: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108
(2013).
163. See Cravath, 895 F.3d at 248.
164. Id. at 246. In making this pronouncement, the court was following a line of
previous cases, including In re Sarrio, which applied reasoning from the Supreme Court's

case of Fisher v. United States. See In re Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 1997)
(citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404 (1976)).
165. See In re Effecten-Spiegel AG, No. 18mc93, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135837, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2018) (discussing a number of considerations affecting the petition
in addition to the traditional Intel factors).
166. See id. at *5-7 (responding to the plaintiffs request to obtain all documents
held by any Merrill Lynch entity that could bear a relation to Merrill Lynch's financial
relationship to Porsche, the defendant in the foreign litigation giving rise to the § 1782
request).
167. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 260 (2004).

20201

INTERPRETATIVE CHALLENGES OF28 US.C. § 1782

1405

the production of confidential information held by third parties. 16 8 In

this case, a corporation sought discovery for use in German litigation
concerning misappropriation of trade secrets. 169 The district court,
exercising its discretionary power, denied the application despite it
fulfilling the Intel requirements.170 In particular, the court focused on

the apparent unreceptiveness of the German court towards the
requested discovery.171 The Third Circuit reviewed the decision.17 2 In

relation to Intel's first factor, the court saw as permissible a § 1782
application requiring the production of confidential discovery for a
proceeding in Germany when the "real" party from whom discovery
was sought was neither the US-based law firm nor its client, but

instead a German company. 1 73 In opposition to the Second Circuit, the
court here seemed to view the request for materials in a favorable light
due to the applicant's impossibility to obtain such discovery in
Germany.1 74 Furthermore, the court made clear that it has never
endorsed an interpretative approach that limits § 1782 requests to
parties who have already sought the discovery in the foreign forum, to
materials that would be welcomed by the foreign tribunal, or to a very
limited and specific request.1 75 The Third Circuit's statement as to
amenability of a foreign tribunal to receive a given piece of discovery
seems particularly relevant because it points towards a different
interpretation of Intel's second factor (foreign court's amenability to
United States' assistance), and in particular, of what it means to

168. See generally In re Biomet Orthopaedics Switz. GmbH, 742 F. App'x 690 (3d
Cir. 2018) (noting that the district court below improperly placed the burden on the
applicant to show that the foreign tribunal would "welcome" discovery under the third
Intel factor).
169. See id. at 692-94.
170. The Third Circuit said that "The District court assumed arguendo that the §
1782 statutory factors had been met, but concluded that the discretionary Intel factors
(set out below) for granting a § 1782 application 'weigh[ed] against enforcing the
subpoena."' Id. at 694 (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
171. See id. Interestingly, the German court accepted the discovery and eventually
found in favor of the applicant, in part based on information arising from the U.S.obtained discovery. See Folkman, supra note 134 (discussing the outcome of the case and
the events that unfolded).
172. See In re Biomet, 742 F. App'x at 694.
173. See id. at 696-97 (noting that the information sought was from a German
company).
174. See id. at 696 (citing Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591,
596 (7th Cir. 2011)).
175. Id. at 698 (contrasting the Third Circuit's approach with that of the Ninth
Circuit). Contra In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 533-34 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding
that the Intel factors plainly weighed in favor of discovery against respondents because
they were not a party to the foreign proceedings, there was no evidence that the foreign
proceedings would be unreceptive to the evidence, and respondents had failed to argue
that petitioners were attempting to procure documents that they could not have obtained
in the foreign proceeding).
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consider "the receptivity of the foreign government, court or agency to
176
federal-court judicial assistance."

E.

A Summary of the Existent Postures

Legal scholarship, in its normative approach, plays a relevant role
in "influenc[ing] judges, lawyers, legislators or regulators to reform,
177
The scholarship also aids
interpret, or preserve existing law."
national and transnational legal systems by interpreting existing laws

and advancing proposals for legal reform. 178 Therefore, this subpart
seeks to advance some noteworthy proposals that discuss the
interpretation, construction, and reform of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782 and that

are relevant to this Note's proposed solution. Most of the cited authors
focus solely on one of the issues discussed in Part III, subparts A
through D, although some authors take a broader scope and assess the
current language of § 1782 with the intent to solve several of its
179
interpretative issues at once.
80
takes issue with the effect of § 1782 in
Tyler B. Robinson'

arbitration procedures, looking at the issue from a perspective
18
concerning the extraterritorial application of the statute. 1 Robinson

first looks at the plain text of the statute, which he contends prescribes
a clear, default rule "thatthe production of documents [and testimony]
'shall be . . . in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."' 8 2 Hence, Robinson concludes that "the extent of
[documentary and] testimonial evidence a US court is authorized to
provide under § 1782 is equal to that authorized under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure."1

83

This means that the plain language of the

statute allows extraterritorial application so long as the documents or

176. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004). While
the Second Circuit seems to interpret this consideration in a positive way (that is,
whether the foreign court would accept the requested documents), the Third Circuit has
a negative approach to the inquiry (whether the foreign tribunal would reject the
discovery).
177. See Danielle K. Citron & Robin West, On Legal Scholarship, AsS'N AM. L.
SCHS. (2014), https://www.aals.org/current-issues-in-legal-education/legal-scholarship/
[https://perma.cc/74H2-NFZQ] (archived July 17, 2020) (discussing the strengths and
weakness of legal scholarship).
178. See id. (noting the ways in which legal education aides in legal
interpretation).
179. See supra Part III.A-D.
180. Tyler Robinson is an international commercial litigation and arbitration
partner at the London office of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. See Tyler Robinson
Firm Biography, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT, LLP, https://www.stblaw.com/our-

team/partners/tyler-b-robinson (last visited Aug. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/PQY2JMAT] (archived Aug. 24, 2020).
181. See Robinson, supra note 13, at 138 (explaining that § 1782 arbitration can
be seen from the perspective of extraterritorial application of US law).
182. See id. at 144.
183. See id. at 139.
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testimony sought are subject to protection under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.1 84 He further maintains that the legislative intent and
policy objectives underlying § 1782 support this position.1 85 However,

in his reading of the statute, he makes a key distinction between the
results of this interpretation in obtaining documents as opposed to

testimony: "whereas a person may be served with a subpoena
commanding the production of documents he controls somewhere else,
'[w]hat a person will testify to is located wherever that person is
found."1 86 In conclusion, a literal interpretation of § 1782 would not
preclude a party from obtaining discovery outside of the United States
so long as the person or entity providing the discovery is found or
resides within the United States, while obtaining of testimony under

the statute is limited because "U.S. court[s] cannot issue a subpoena
that contemplates the deposition of a non-party to be taken outside the
United States."1 87
Daniel J. Rothstein1 88 also discusses the impact of § 1782 in
arbitration and international commercial litigation.1 8 9 Rothstein

maintains that there is ample evidence supporting the fact that

§ 1782

was not drafted for use in private arbitration.1 90 In particular,
Rothstein points toward the United States' failure to ratify the New
York Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards until
1970; the lack of proposals regarding the inclusion of a provision
providing for arbitration assistance in the Hague Evidence
Convention; and the apparently inexistent discussion of this issue in

the professional literature of the time.191 Although Rothstein
recognizes that "it would be desirable for US law to allow courts to
require the production of evidence for use in a foreign private
arbitration," he believes that interpreting the current wording of
§ 1782 to that extent would create further legal issues. 192 In particular,

Rothstein worries that a holding conceding that

§ 1782 applies to

184. See id. at 143 (noting that the plain language of the statute affords discretion
to district courts).
185. See id. (noting that courts have turned to, among other things, the legislative
intent of § 1782).
186. See id. at 154.
187. Id. at 155.
188. Daniel Rothstein is a New York-based attorney who focuses on issues arising
in the international commercial litigation context. See Professionals, BALLON STOLL
BADER & NADLER, P.C., http://www.ballonstoll.com/professionals/ (last visited Sept. 8,

2020) [https://perma.cc/V5XF-DQRH] (archived Sept. 8, 2020) (under "Partners," scroll
to the right to Mr. Rothstein's name; then click on his name to bring up his biography).
189. See generally Daniel J. Rothstein, A Proposalto Clarify U.S. Law on Judicial
Assistance in Taking Evidence for InternationalArbitration, 19 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 61

(2008).
190. See id. at 61-62 (discussing how the state of United States' law on
international arbitration at the time of § 1782's enactment shows that Congress did not
intend to open this avenue of discovery for use in arbitral tribunals).
191. See id. at 68-77.
192. See id. at 88-89.
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private arbitration would be both inconsistent and in conflict with the
international
Federal Arbitration Act's provisions governing
arbitration.19 3 He thus proposes an amendment of § 1782 that
includes, among others, a rule requiring arbitrators'approval before a
request is submitted, court deference to an arbitrator's decision, a
definition of international arbitration, and a provision limiting § 1782
94
From an opposite perspective, Arthur
to foreign proceedings.1
95
contends that the Supreme Court adopted Hans Smit's
Rovine1
definition of tribunal in Intel and that this definition included arbitral
tribunals.1 96 He further contends that the wording of § 1782 ("foreign
or international tribunals") is "sufficiently broad to include both
97
private and state-sponsored tribunals."1

Laura Malament1 98

takes

a different

approach,

generally

accepting that private arbitration proceedings can be within the scope
of

§ 1782 and proposing a four-step framework for courts to determine

whether they should grant a discovery request. 199 In a nutshell, courts

should first determine "whether the arbitral body is a 'foreign or

international tribunal' under

§ 1782(a) according to Intel's functional

definition of tribunal"; if the answer is yes, the court should then

analyze (1) who made the request and (2) who has to fulfill it, (3) the
applicable discoverability procedures, and (4) "whether the request is
2 00
unduly intrusive or burdensome," following Intel's guidance.

From yet another perspective,
a restrictive reading of the statute
of this mechanism has in foreign
current judicial interpretation of §

Lauren Ann Ross 20 1 advocates for
based on the repercussions the use
litigation. 20 2 Ross argues that the
1782 mostly fails to account for key

193. See id. at 77-78 (describing the confusion and inconsistencies that would
come out of this approach).
194. See id. at 79-83.
195. Arthur Rovine is a former attorney at Baker & McKenzie and has since,
among other functions and position, served as an international arbitrator under ICSID,
ARTHUR ROVINE,
Curriculum Vitae,
See
PCA and AAA/ICDR.
NAFTA,
http://www.arthurwrovine.com/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ABC5E9PJ] (archived Sept. 8, 2020).
196. See Rovine, supra note 105, at 471-72 ("In my judgment, there is much to
suggest that the Supreme Court was adopting Hans' definition of 'tribunal."').
197. Id. at 464.
198. Laura E. Malament is an antitrust attorney. See Laura Malament,
https://www.concurrences.com/en/authors/lmalament-jonesday-com
CONCURRENCES,
(last visited Aug. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/L93V-HW2N] (archived Sept. 8, 2020).
199. Malament, supra note 104, at 1217, 1237-44.
200. Id.
201.

Lauren Ann Ross is an attorney at the firm Covington & Burling. Laura Ann

BURLING,
&
COVINGTON
Biography,
Firm
Ross
(last visited Aug. 24, 2020)
https://www.cov.com/enprofessionals/r/lauren-ross
[https://perma.cc/RWW3-LNVK] (archived Aug. 24, 2020).
202. See Lauren Ann Ross, A Comparative Critique to U.S. Courts'Approach to EDiscovery in Foreign Trials, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 313, 314 (2012) ("A provision like
§ 1782 . . . should be examined in light of its repercussions in foreign litigation rather
than treated as a normal request under the FRCP in U.S. domestic litigation.").
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procedural differences in the obtaining and discoverability of
documents within a number of countries. 203 This failure to account for

differences between common and civil law systems, she contends,
causes burdens both for the foreign court and the US litigant. 204
Therefore, courts interpreting § 1782 and the Intel factors should (1)
"carefully differentiate between . . . discovery requests that originate

from the foreign court and those that arise from other sources" and (2)
read the Intel factors "through a comparative lens," examining the
usage of the discovery obtained through the statute in the foreign
procedure. 20 5
A review of scholarship dealing with 28 U.S.C. § 1782 reveals a
number of issues:
1.

Interpretation of the statute has been confronted mostly by
practitioners, with little contribution from law school
professors and nonpracticing researchers, who normally have

more time and focused resources to find suitable alternatives
2.

3.

to normative problems.
The authors, probably due to the nature of their work and their
professional interests, tend to focus on a single issue presented
by the statute, as opposed to engaging in a comprehensive

review of § 1782's current drafting defects.
The nuanced approach taken by some of the authors discussing

§ 1782 might be an impediment to finding a solution that
actually makes the statute clearer and more workable.
In conclusion, this nuanced approach and a failure to examine the
many facets of judicial interpretation of § 1782 are likely the reason
why current legal scholarship has been unable to provide a concrete,
substantial proposal that results in a successful reform of the troubled
statutory language.

IV. REFORMING 28 U.S.C. § 1782 TO AFFORD ASSISTANCE IN EVERY
POSSIBLE INSTANCE WHILE ESTABLISHING SAFEGUARDS TO PRESERVE
THE INTEGRITY OF OUR ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

The final Part of this Note discusses a number of alternatives
available to Congress in order to cure the defects present in 28 U.S.C.

203. See id. at 315 ("Different countries have different legal systems, which
typically have different perceptions of privacy, different views on the amount of
information discoverable in civil proceedings, and different evidentiary standards.").
204. In particular, Ross maintains that foreign courts will be overwhelmed by a
flood of discovery materials that judges are forced to review due to a lack of standards
limiting admissibility of evidence, and that foreign parties will be able to obtain much
more information about a United States-based party than vice versa. See id. at 324-25.
205. Id. at 328.
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§ 1782's current drafting.2 0 6 First, this Part explores and, for the most
part, rejects the models adopted by other common and civil law

countries due to the effect that implementing any of those systems
would have on the adversarial model. 207 Then, it moves on to propose
a statutory reform of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782 (including a new definitional

section and codification of a modified Intel analysis), which would be
respectful of our current litigation system while providing clear

guidance to courts in deciding whether to accept a discovery production
208
In making this proposal, this
request for use in a foreign proceeding.

Note focuses on crafting a formula that can both afford assistance to
parties in every possible instance, 209 while establishing appropriate
safeguards that limit judicial discretion and avoid undue prejudice to
210
American parties, the judicial system, and sovereignty interests.

A.

Other Jurisdictions' Frameworks as Alternatives.

Since the issues arising from 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782 have a clear

transnational impact, the procedures by which foreign jurisdictions

grant discovery to be used in other forums might be useful to frame the
approach our domestic legislature ought to take. Furthermore, the
steady growth of globalization and international transactions over the
last few decades has created a push for legal harmonization that has
motivated countries around the world to change their domestic practice
in accordance with multilaterally agreed rules and standards in a
21 1
But, should this legal
variety of commercial and economic matters.
harmonization trend extend to the regulation of discovery, whether

domestic

or transnational? If so, what would be the potential

downsides to making such changes to our legal system? And, would
they be worth it?

As previously discussed, the United States' understanding of
discovery is broad and tends to be at the most generous extreme of the
spectrum of currently available legal approaches, while other common

206. For a discussion of § 1782's drafting defects, see supra Parts II-III.
207. See infra Part I.A.
208. See infra Part IV.B.
209. See Smit, American Assistance, supra note 14, at 2 (reiterating that the § 1782
should be read in accordance with its liberal spirit and insisting that is not the drafting
of the statute, but the reluctance of courts to appropriately read the statute that is
leading to interpretative issues).
210.

See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

243 (1968) ("[E]ffective judicial administration is necessary to implement the goals and
letter of the rules.... Effective judicial supervision requires a consensus on the meaning
of the rules throughout the judicial system.").
211. See Pierrick Le Goff, Global Law: A Legal Phenomenon Emerging from the
Process of Globalization, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119, 120 (2007) ("[D]iverging
national laws create significant obstacles to cross-border transactions, such that efforts
toward the harmonization of national legal principles through the production of a 'set of
global substantive rules' are more than welcome.").

20201

INTERPRETATIVE CHALLENGES OF 28 U.S.C

f

1782

1411

law systems, most notoriously that of the United Kingdom, take a more
neutral stance. 2 12 At the same time, a majority of European countries
concentrate at the opposite end of the spectrum, in part due to the
reduced role of discovery in the civil law system. 213 Due to the
particularities of these two legal systems, it is convenient to separate
countries by the system to which they belong when analyzing their
foreign discovery legal frameworks and whether any of those
frameworks should be followed by the United States.

1.

Common Law Approaches

Generally speaking, common law jurisdictions tend to have a more
liberal view of discovery, and hence, are more willing to allow foreign

parties to pursue discovery for use in another country. 214 Just as the
United States deals with these requests through 28 U.S.C. § 1782, the
United Kingdom 215 and Canada 2 16 have their own statutes regulating

212. See, e.g., Melinda F. Levitt, Discovery' in the United States, DATAGUIDANCE
(Nov.
1,
2011),
https://www.foley.com//media/files/insights/publications/2011/1 1/discovery-in-the-united-states/files/discoveryin-the-united-states/fileattachment/levittusa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XB9Q-DEKY]
(archived July 18, 2020) ("Perhaps one of the most controversial-and disdainedaspects of the legal system in the United States is the very broad and extensive concept
of 'discovery' in civil lawsuits.").
213. See, e.g., Lukas Holub, Discovery Abroad: An Overview of EuropeanBlocking
Statutes and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Outside the U.S.-Part
One of Two, NITA, https://www.nita.org/blogs/discovery-abroad-an-overview-ofeuropean-blocking-statutes-and-the-hague-convention-on-the-taking-of-evidenceoutside-the-uspart-one-of-two (last visited July 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/8PRY-B56M]
(archived July 18, 2020) ("One of the areas where the common law and civil law systems
diametrically differ is the process of obtaining evidence in expectation of trial or during
trial.... The process of obtaining evidence in civil law countries is significantly different.
The use of the term 'discovery' is not appropriate, because the pre-trial discovery as
understood in the U.S. practically does not exist.").
214. But see GLASER, supra note 210, at 233-34 (arguing that although the
expansion of discovery in common law countries is a result of the relaxation of the
adversarial model of litigation, it is the adversarial model that has guided how discovery
works in practice in these jurisdictions); see also HARKNESS, MOLoo, OH & YIM, supra
note 26, at 61 (indicating that Australia does not permit pre-trial discovery under its
domestic laws and has entered a reservation under the Hague Evidence Convention
barring discovery cooperation when the discovery would be employed for pre-trial
purposes). A Hague Evidence Convention reservation is related to Article 23 of the
Hague Evidence Convention, which recognizes the right of a Contracting State not to
execute Letters of Request "issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common law countries." Hague Convention on the Taking of

Evidence Abroad, supra note 47, art. 23.
215. The United Kingdom has enacted the Evidence (Proceedings in Other
Jurisdictions) Act 1975 ("EPOJA"), which enables United Kingdom courts to assist both
domestic and foreign parties in the obtention of evidence for proceedings in foreign
courts. See Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, c. 34, §§ 1-9 (U.K.).
216. The rule governing extraterritorial discovery in Canada is the Canada
Evidence Act ("CEA"), supplemented by additional statutes regulating rules of evidence
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the foreign discovery issue. The three legal systems (1) impose
statutory prerequirements to the issuance of discovery for use in third
countries and (2) allow for judicial discretion, 217 with the Canadian
218
At the same
system closely resembling that of the United States.

time, the United Kingdom's legal scheme for discovery presents some
key differences when compared to the American and Canadian

frameworks. In particular, the United Kingdom's statute, Evidence

provincially. See Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-5, s 43-51; HARKNESS, MOLOO,
OH & YIM, supra note 26, at 63 (providing an overview of the CEA).
217. EPOJA allows courts to exercise discretion in whether to grant a discovery
request and imposes few limitations to the way in which a court decides to approach a
request. However, the statute limits the use of this procedure in relation to international
proceedings. As a result, submission of a letter of request compliant with EPOJA or
voluntary compliance by the party having to fulfill the request are necessary for a United
Kingdom court to grant discovery. See Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act
§§ 2, 6(3); see also Steven Loble, UK Guide to Obtaining Evidence in England for Use in
Proceedings in the United States of America, MONDAQ (Mar. 27, 2008),
http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x/57600/Federal+Law/Guide+To+Obtaining+Evidence+In+
England+For+Use+In+Proceedings+In+The+United+States+Of+America
[https://perma.c/CZ7M-D7VL] (archived July 18, 2020); Richard Marshall & Kim
Stephenson, Transatlantic Litigation: Obtaining Evidence from a UK Entity for Use in
US Court Proceedings, PENNINGTONS MANCHES COOPER (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://www.penningtonslaw.com/news-publications/latest-news/

2

018/transatlantic-

litigation-obtaining-evidence-from-a-uk-entity-for-use-in-us-court-proceedings
[https://perma.cc/Y2EJ-KB8V] (archived July 18, 2020). Under the CEA, a Canadian
court will issue a production of discovery order after receiving a letter rogatory from a
foreign court in relation to a "civil, commercial, or criminal matter [that] is pending."
Canada Evidence Act s 51(2). As a result, a "Canadian court will generally give effect to
foreign requests for judicial assistance out of deference and respect for the comity of
nations." Vincent M. de Grandpre & Alyssa Brierly, What You Should Know About
Ass'N,
CAN.
B.
in
Canada,
Letters
Rogatory
Foreign
Enforcing
http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/PDF/IP10_deGrandpre paper.pdf (last visited July 18, 2020)
[https://perma.c/49AQ-AMVY] (archived July 18, 2020) (citing Morguard Investments,
Ltd. v. De savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.); Zingre v. The Queen, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392
(Can.); AstraZeneca, LP v. Stephen Wolman, 2009 CarswellOnt 7787 (S.C.J.);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Rybiak, [2006] 275 D.L.R. 4th 512 (Can. Ont. C.A.)).
Generally, a court will give full force to foreign requests so long as they are not contrary
to public policy or prejudicial to Canada's sovereignty. See id. Although review of these
requests varies province-by-province, Ontario's (and other provinces) judicial review of
foreign discovery requests is, at least structurally, very similar to our § 1782 test. See
HARKNESS, MOLOO, OH & YIM, supra note 26, at 64 (discussing a four-step process under
the CEA).
218.

Approval of a discovery request for use in another country in Canada involves

the fulfilment of four statutory pre-conditions and a six-factor discretionary analysis by
the court. The four statutory preconditions are: (1) the party from whom evidence is
sought is within the Ontario court's jurisdiction; (2) the foreign court has a desire to
obtain the evidence or has otherwise authorized its obtention; (3) the evidence is related
to a civil, commercial, or criminal matter pending in a foreign court; and (4) the foreign
court is "a court of competing jurisdiction." Pamela D. Pengelley, A Compelling Situation:
Enforcing American Letters Rogatory in Ontario, 85 CANADIAN B. REV. 345, 350-53
(2006). The factors affecting exercise of a court's discretion are: (1) the discovery is
relevant and (2) necessary, (3) not otherwise obtainable, (4) not contrary to public policy,
(5) it has been identified with reasonable specificity, and (6) it is not unduly burdensome.
See, e.g., id. (enumerating the statutory preconditions to enforcing a letter rogatory in

Ontario and summarizing the balancing test crafted by the courts of Ontario).
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(Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act (EPOJA), requires that the
forum court agree to the request or submit the request on behalf of the
party (an ex-ante approach that lessens comity and foreign
discoverability concerns); 2 19 the scope of discovery permitted is much
more limited since UK courts' rules with regard to discovery are

restrictive and preclude the use of discovery request to engage in
"fishing expeditions" or investigatory procedures; 220 and the statute
contains a definitional section that expressly defines the term
"international proceedings." 22 1 While the Canadian and American
systems of evaluating foreign discovery requests are too similar for the
Canadian system to be of much help in solving the issues present in
our system, 222 differences in the United Kingdom's approach provide
useful guideposts to redefine the scope of § 1782. In particular,
imitating EPOJA's incorporation of a definitional section could prove
useful to our system because a curated set of definitions would clarify

the overall legislative mandate, 22 3 reduce uncertainty for the parties,

219. Having the approval of the court where litigation will take place is a necessary
but, however, not sufficient, condition to having a foreign discovery request granted by
a court in the United Kingdom. If the United Kingdom-based court considers that such
approval has not undergone "real scrutiny," it conserves the ability to examine
"questions of relevance and oppression" before granting the discovery request. See Ian
McDonald & Catherina Yurchyshyn, English High Court Clarifies the Position on
English Courts Assisting in Obtaining Evidence for Use in Foreign Court Proceedings,
LEXoLOGY (June 5, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/document.ashx?g=09fOa3bO7a7f-433f-8c2e-360990dbfb12 [https://perma.cc/G4TU-V5PF] (archived July 18, 2020)
(discussing the main takeaways of a recent case involving EPOJA).
220. See Marshall & Stephenson, supra note 217 (noting that UK discovery
procedures are comparatively more restrictive). In addition to their domestic discovery
rules barring discovery requests that could potentially entail fishing expeditions, the
United Kingdom, a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention, also executed an Article
23 reservation to its cooperation commitments under the Convention. See Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Evidence and
Service Conventions, 7 ¶ 29, https://assets.hcch.net/dos/Oedbc4f7-675b-4b7b-8elc2c1998655a3e.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G3GK-74GH] (archived
Sept. 8, 2020).
221. In relevant part, the Act states:
[I]nternational proceedings' means proceedings before the
International

Court

of Justice

or any

other

court,

tribunal,

commission, body or authority (whether consisting of one or more
persons) which, in pursuance of any international agreement or any

resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, exercises
any jurisdiction or performs any functions of a judicial nature or by
way of arbitration, conciliation or inquiry or is appointed (whether
permanently or temporarily) for the purpose of exercising any
jurisdiction or performing any such functions.

Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act § 6(3).
222. See supra notes 220-21.
223. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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and assist the judiciary in understanding the purpose and spirit of the
statute. 224

2.

Civil Law Approach
Most European countries share a similar approach towards

international cooperation

in pretrial matters.

These

restrictive

approaches are justified by the absence of pretrial procedures (at least,
22 5
the
in the sense understood by common law jurisdictions),
institution of an inquisitorial, as opposed to adversarial, judicial
system, 226 and the existence of a principle of judicial cooperation within
the European Union (including mutual recognition of judgments,

exchange of documents, and taking of evidence) 227 that reduces the
number of instances in which a European jurisdiction will be required
8
to request international cooperation. 22 Most states present legal

229
frameworks that either do not contemplate pretrial discovery at all

224. See Ankita Singh, Interpretation of Statutes, ACADEMIKE (Nov. 13, 2015),
https://www.lawetopus.com/academike/interpretation-statutes/ [https://perma.cc/2BFR8VC3] (archived July 18, 2020) (discussing the benefits of incorporating a definitional
section into a statute).
225. See, e.g., Marissa L. P. Caylor, Note, Modernizing the Hague Evidence
Convention: A Proposed Solution to Cross-Border Discovery Conflicts During Civil and
Commercial Litigation, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 341, 363-68 (2010) (discussing the structural
differences of civil litigation in common and civil law jurisdictions and advocating for the
need of a unified definition of "pre-trial"to overcome the hurdles that these structural
differences have imposed in international judicial cooperation).
226. See generally Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The
Search for Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice
Systems, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 185 (2002) (comparing the values proposed by the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems and how these systems reflect on the judicial
procedure and outcomes).

227.

See Iwona Miedzinska, Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters in the European

Union, in VILNIUS UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAw, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF PHD
STUDENTS AND YOUNG RESEARCHERS: THE INTERACTION OF NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS:
CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE? 202-07 (2013) (describing the basic framework of

judicial cooperation in civil matters within the European Union and its underlying
goals).
228. Reciprocity is a strong incentive for countries engaging in extensive judicial
cooperation (see, for example, the goals of the United States in engaging in international
cooperation as reflected by the twin aims of 28 U.S.C. § 1782). Therefore, when
sovereigns no longer have a sense of urgency in obtaining access to discovery in foreign
jurisdictions, their motivation to grant foreign parties to their judicial systems is
diminished. For a better understanding of the European judicial cooperation process and
how it can change the system of motivations and incentives of the Union, see Judicial
Cooperation,

EUR.

UNION,

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-

cooperationen (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7SX9-ZBDW] (archived July
18, 2020) ("Judicial cooperation in Europe aims to help people resolve administrative or
legal issues in other EU countries as easily as at home.").
229. The German judicial system does not contemplate pre-trial discovery of
documents and "there is no general obligation to produce documents to assist the
opposing party." HARKNESS, MOLOO, OH & YIM., supra note 26, at 68. As a result,
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or curtail the availability of such discovery through the enactment of
"blocking statutes." 230 Although most European countries have
assumed an obligation to cooperate in discovery matters pursuant to

the Hague Evidence Convention, many of them have, in accordance
with the spirit of their domestic procedural rules, filed a reservation

under Article 23 severely limiting international judicial cooperation in
discovery matters when the discovery's purpose is related to pretrial
matters. 23 1 A number of European Union regulations further limit

German courts will assist parties in a foreign proceeding only (1) after a court's issuance
of a Letter of Request in a civil or commercial proceeding that has a pending or
contemplated trial, (2) when the party from whom the discovery is requested provides
such discovery willingly, or (3) when the party from whom the discovery is sought is a
national or permanent resident of the jurisdiction seeking the discovery. See Obtaining
Evidence from Germany for Use in a U.S. Civil or Commercial Trial, REED SMITH (Feb.
2006),
https://www.reedsmith.coml-/media/files/perspectives/2006/02/legalupdate/files/obtaining-evidence-from-germany-for-use-in-a-us-

ci/fileattachment/german_witnesses.pdf [https://perma.ccU2NX-S6E8] (archived July
18, 2020) (noting the circumstances in which German courts will assist parties in foreign
proceedings).

230.

In 1986, France expressed its "intention for the [Hague] Convention to be the

'sole means by which discovery demands emanating from other signatory countries

would be carried out in French soil."' Elena del Valle, ObtainingEvidence in France for
Use in the United States, 1 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 266, 272 (1991) (citing Brief
for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, In Re Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1695)).
Although France will generally cooperate with foreign authorities in the obtention of
discovery under the Hague Convention, it will only do so in limited circumstances in the
case of "pre-trial discovery of documents ... in Common Law countries." French Republic
Declaration/Reservation/Notification,
HCCH,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/statustable/notifications/?csid=501&disp=resdn
(last
visited
Feb.
27,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/5XNK-RZJF] (archived July 19, 2020). In particular, the reservation
"does not apply when the requested documents are enumerated limitatively in the Letter
of Request and have a direct and precise link with the object of the procedure." Id. French
courts' approach to requests for discovery based on the provisions of the Hague Evidence
Convention (including its Article 23 reservation) is further understood by examining the
French Civil Procedure Code in combination with the Law No. 80-538, also known as the
"blocking statute." See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 733-48 (Fr.); Loi 80-538
du 16 juillet 1980 relative a la communication de documents ou renseignments d'ordre
economique, commercial ou technique a des personnes physiques ou morales etrangeres
[Law 80-538 of July 16, 1980 Related to the Communication of Documents or Information
of an Economic, Commercial or Technical Order to Foreign Natural or Legal Persons],
art. 1 bis, JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF

FRANCE], July 17, 1980, p. 1799. Through these provisions, France "prohibits the
gathering of business-related information to be used in foreign litigation" and imposes
criminal sanctions in case of violations, making a single exception for discovery pursued
in accordance to the Hague Evidence Convention. Laurent Martiner & Ozan Akyurek,
The Perils of Taking Discovery to France, 20 PRAC. LITIGATOR 39, 40 (2009).
231. Among others, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have
executed Article 23 reservations partially (France) or fully (all others) excluding
assistance in relation to pre-trial discovery of documents. See Table Reflecting

Applicability of Articles 15, 16, 17, 18 and 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention, HCCH
(June 2017), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/627a201b-6c7a-4dc2-86ad-c1da582447d4.pdf
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Member States' domestic courts' ability to cooperate with foreign
23 2
In conclusion, in civil law-based
parties in discovery matters.
(1) barred from considering
either
are
courts
European countries,
for
use in a foreign venue or (2)
requests
discovery
pretrial litigation
such requests, to the extent
consider
severely limited in their ability to
233
occur.
rarely
will
that international cooperation

Overall, it would be unwise for the United States to shift its
approach to discovery to resemble that of the European nations since
Europe's position stems from its nonexistent pretrial process and its
234
further, such a posture would undermine
judges' fact-finding role;

the effectiveness of the Hague Evidence Convention and stand in
opposition to the liberal spirit of a variety of discovery-related statutes
enacted by Congress. 235 Additionally, an exceedingly restrictive
position towards issuance of discovery could arguably go against the
very

principles underlying the American

adversarial system. 236

Liberal discovery grants have become key to the current operation of
the American litigation system: although at times liberal discovery

gives tools for parties to inappropriately extend the life expectancy of
their cases, it has also reduced the role of courts in litigation by

[https://perma.cc/7QAN-WBXM] (archived July 19, 2020) (noting discrepancies between
countries' treatment of these discovery procedures).
232. In particular, Article 5(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 of 22
November 1996 precludes compliance with discovery requests based on certain United
States' laws allowing for extraterritorial application. See Council Regulation 2271/96,
art. 5(1), 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1, 2 (EC); HARKNESS, MOLoo, OH & YIM., supra note 26, at 67
(describing Article 5(1)). Additionally, Article 25(1) of the Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 1995 precludes judicial assistance
unless the receiving jurisdiction can ensure that personal data will receive appropriate
treatment and protection. See Council Directive 1995/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 45 (EC);
HARKNESS MOLOO, OH & YIM, supra note 26, at 67 (describing Article 25(1)).
233. See generally Edmund M. O'Toole & David N. Cinotti, E-Discovery in CrossBorder Litigation: Taking International Comity Seriously, Fall 2010 INT'L DIsP. REsOL.
NEWS 1, 21 (discussing a number of reasons why European jurisdictions have decided to
limit pretrial disclosure of information).
See supra Part IV.A.2.
234.
235. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2018); The Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note 47, pmbl.
236. The adversarial system gives the parties ample control over the proceeding,
making them responsible for pre-trial matters and allowing them to assemble the
strongest possible case for presentation to the court. If the parties did not have broad
access to information through discovery tools, the procedure would be seriously
undermined. See Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1
CHAP. L. REV. 57, 57 (1998) ('In its simplest terms, an adversary system resolves
disputes by presenting conflicting views of fact and law to an impartial and relatively
passive arbiter...."); see also E. Allan Lind, John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Discovery
and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MIcH. L.
REV. 1129, 1130 (1973) ('"The adversary system presupposes that the most effective
means of determining truth is to place upon a skilled advocate for each side the
responsibility for investigating and presenting the facts from a partisan perspective."').
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increasing the possibility of cases settling between the parties. 237 More

importantly, the United States' liberal discovery rules are directly
related to some of the main interests underlying the adversarial
system, such as finding the truth or providing the parties to a dispute
with an equal opportunity to succeed on the merits of a case. 23 8 These
interests permeate the main regulatory framework governing the

United States' contemporary litigation process (the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure). 239 At the same time, the narrowness of discovery
rules in other jurisdictions is not only explained by the structural
differences of their legal systems, but also by cultural differences. Such
differences have caused those jurisdictions' legal frameworks to take
paths that are divergent from that of the United States and to assign
preeminence to values that might not be as relevant to American

society; for example, in contrast to the United States' primacy of truthseeking, the United Kingdom "emphasize [s] proportionality in pretrial

disclosure of information," and the European Union puts a premium
on data privacy. 2 40 Therefore, dramatically narrowing the scope and
availability of discovery for use in foreign procedures in the United
States would not only go against the principles upon which the
American litigation system is built, but would also be in contraposition
to virtually every other discovery rule and the longstanding case law
discussing the matter.

B.

Amending 28 U. S. C.

§ 1782

As discussed above, blindly adopting another jurisdiction's
discovery rules with regard to foreign discovery issues seems
incongruent and incompatible with the overall spirit of our litigation

system and the letter of the Rules of Civil Procedure.2 41 At the same

237. Kuo-Chang Huang, Does Discovery Promote Settlement? An Empirical
Answer, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 241 (2009) (discussing the results of an empirical
study about the number of settlements in civil cases in Taiwan pre- and post-enactment
of pre-trial discovery rules and extrapolating those result to the American experience).

238. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (the purpose of our discovery
rules is "for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial."); Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Credible Discovery,
Settlement, and Negative Expected Value Suits, 40 RAND J. EcON. 636, 636-37 (2009)
("The actual legal process, however, has many devices that enable parties to
substantially reduce or eliminate these informational asymmetries. . . . To the extent

there is asymmetric information, this state is not fixed and final. Rather, the uninformed
party has the choice to undertake discovery to equalize the informational imbalance.").
239. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 34, 45 (governing the discovery process).
240. See O'Toole & Cinotti, supra note 233, at 22-24 (discussing the divergence in
value that each jurisdiction assigns to different principles and rights due to their
underlying regulatory contexts); see also supra note 232 (discussing a number of
European Union regulations curtailing member states' ability to internationally
cooperate in discovery issues, in part, due to privacy concerns).
241. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the main features of alternative discovery
frameworks adopted in a variety of common and civil law countries).
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28 U.S.C.

§ 1782's drafting to remain in its current state, most notoriously, a lack
of homogeneity in the courts' response to requests.
In finding a satisfactory solution to this issue, a number of

countervailing interests that play a role in how we should approach
cross-border discovery requests should be considered when amending

§ 1782. On the one hand, there is a myriad of incentives to encourage
a construction of § 1782 that fosters international judicial cooperation
and a liberal approach towards issuing discovery, including (1) the
2 42
(2) the spirit and goals
spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

set forth by the Hague Evidence Convention and the New York
Convention, as well as its implementing statute, the Federal
Arbitration Act; 24 3 (3) the legislative history and evolution of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782;244 (4) the United States' interest in promoting its adversarial
system; 24 5 and (5) notions of equity and justice. 246 On the other hand,
there are equally important values that point towards circumscribing
the courts' discretion with regard to those requests, including (1) the
24 7
(2) international comity
protection of domestic parties and interests;

242. An early court identified the liberal spirit of American discovery rules and
described the duty of courts when interpreting them as follows:
These Rules should not be whittled away by strained judicial
interpretations. They should be interpreted broadly and liberally.
The purpose of the examination contemplated by these Rules is to
narrow the issues, promote justice, and thus not make the trial of a
law suit a game of change or of wits. It is in that spirit that these new
Rules should be construed.
Holtzoff, supra note 32, at 208 (quoting Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25
F. Supp. 80, 81-83) (E.D.N.Y. 1938)).
243. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
625 (1985) (declaring that the Federal Arbitration Act was born out of a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitrationagreements") (internal quotations omitted); Neil Kaplan, New
Developments on Written Form, in UNITED NATIONS, ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS
UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 17, 19 (1999) ("[M]ore

and more judges in various jurisdictions are recognizing the existence of an international
arbitration culture and are increasingly taking a more liberal and international
approach...."); see also supra Part II.B (discussing the Hague Evidence Convention).
244. See supra Part II.A (discussing the historical evolution of the statute and its
progressive broadening).
245. For a discussion providing some of the reasons why the adversarial system

(particularly in criminal procedure) is endorsed by the United States, see David Alan
Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634 (2009).
246. See Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions
to Stay Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 72
(2012) (discussing the benefits of discovery, such as balancing information asymmetries
and allowing parties to assess the strength and weakness of their cases and how they
affect the outcome of a case).
247. The Supreme Court has recognized the relevancy of both foreign and domestic
interests in matters of transnational discovery. For a discussion (and critique) of the
Supreme Court's assessment of party and national interests, see Hannah L. Buxbaum,
Assessing Sovereign Interests in Cross-Border Discovery Disputes: Lesson from
Aerospatiale, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87, 89-93 (2003).
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and respect to the nature of foreign procedures; 248 (3) preservation of
key features of the adversarial system that guard a close relationship
to the nature of the legal profession; 249 and, to some extent, (4) equity
and justice towards the defendants or nonparticipants. 250 In subparts

B.1 and B.2, this Note introduces a proposed amendment to the statute
that includes (1) a change in the current wording of the statute, (2) the
addition of a definitional section (inspired by the United Kingdom's

EPOJA), and (3) the codification of a modified judicial balancing test.
These modifications, when taken together, should clarify the
legislative mandate to courts and give them guidance about the exact
boundaries of a § 1782 request.
1.

The Statutory Language Portion

As previously discussed, the statutory-language amendment
portion of this Note's proposed solution seeks to maintain the liberal
character of the statute, while circumscribing the courts' ability to
issue diverging interpretations on a common issue. Ideally, this
solution, when paired with the codification of the modified Intel
analysis,
will
preclude
courts from inserting
discretionary
considerations into their § 1782 analysis and provide them with a

strong inference of the outcome desired by Congress.
i.

Changes to Existing Statutory Language

As part of the statutory amendment, slight changes should be
made to the current language of § 1782(a). In particular, this Note
makes two proposals with regard to the current statutory language: (1)
doing away with the language allowing usage of foreign practices and
procedures and (2) adding language specifying rules that are
particularly important to the court's understanding of the statute. As

a result, the language of the statute would be as follows:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a
foreign
or
international
tribunal,
including
criminal

investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order
may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request

248. See id. at 88-89 (discussing the concept of comity in the context of cooperation
agreements).
249. See GLASER, supra note 210, at 120 (discussing the findings of a survey on
adversary's discovery and finding that attorneys often complain that opposing counsel is
trying to obtain access to privileged information).
250. See, e.g., David R. Hague, Fraudon the Court and Abusive Discovery, 16 NEv.
L.J. 707, 711-17 (2016) (discussing abusive discovery practices and their impact on
parties and the judicial process).
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by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the

application of any interested person and may direct that the
testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing
be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue of
his appointment, the person appointed has power to administer

any necessary oath and take the testimony or statement. The
order may prescribe the practice and procedure for taking the
testimony or statement or producing the document or other

thing. In all cases, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and
the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in particular, in
accordance with Rules 26, 34, and 45.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or
statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation

of any legally applicable privilege. 251
These changes, when considered in tandem, seek to eliminate a factor
providing undue discretion to courts and which might potentially cause
diverging outcomes in cases with similar fact patterns. This is so
because the original language, by first giving discretion to courts to

apply "in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign
country or the international tribunal," and later directing courts to

251.

Compare with the original language:
§ 1782. Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to
litigants before such tribunals
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or
is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign
or international tribunal, including criminal investigations
conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made
pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or

international tribunal or upon the application of any interested
person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or
the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed
by the court. By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has
power to administer any necessary oath and take the testimony or

statement. The order may prescribe the practice and procedure,
which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the
foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the
testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing. To
the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony
or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing
produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or
statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any
legally applicable privilege.
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018).
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otherwise conduct their actions "in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure" opened the field to unnecessary disputes as to
whether courts should account for the practices and procedures of the
foreign litigation's forum or instead apply the familiar federal rules.

There are several reasons that support this proposal. First, if the
concern moving Congress to include such language was international

comity and due respect to foreign judicial systems, that concern is
overstated. Courts could consider international comity when denying a
request under their Rule 26 discretionary powers anyway, and a
foreign court could reject the discovery obtained through § 1782 if not
within the scope of its own procedural rules. 252 Furthermore, Intel has
already indicated that courts should not give undue credit to a foreign
jurisdiction's discovery rules; although a court can take into account
"the receptivity of the foreign government, court, or agency to federalcourt judicial assistance," there is no foreign discoverability rule
embedded in either § 1782 or the Intel analysis. 253 Finally, this
proposal promotes simplicity and bolsters uniformity of decisionmaking throughout different jurisdictions within the United States. 254
This amendment will also lead to more accurate, legally correct, and
just outcomes since it does not require judges to apply foreign and
unfamiliar procedures.25 5
ii.

Addition of a Definitions Section

To further strengthen the position of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, this Note
also proposes reorganizing § 1782 and including a new section which
provides a set of definitions that would give support to the otherwise
vague wording of current § 1782 (a). 256 These definitions would precede
the already existing provisions (that is, § 1782 (a) and (b) would become
§ 1782 (b) and (c)) and solve at once several of the current
interpretative conflicts faced by the circuit courts. In particular,
definitions for the concepts of (1) "residing" or "being found" in the

252.

See In re Biomet Orthopaedics Switz. GmbH, 742 F. App'x 690, 694 (3d Cir.

2018) (detailing the process of discovery under German law); In re Malev Hungarian

Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that the district court's goal was
minimizing the discovery burdens in the Hungarian courts); In re 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 249
F.R.D. 96, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting the advantages and disadvantages of cooperation
with foreign courts).

253.

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004).

254.

Uniformity is furthered by the new wording precluding the issuance of orders

prescribing parties to apply the procedures of foreign courts, which might be in
opposition to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
255. See, e.g., Ernest G. Lorenzen, Renvoi Theory and Application of ForeignLaw,
10 COLUM. L. REv. 190 (1910) (this canonical article discusses the difficulties faced by
courts required to apply foreign laws after being confronted with situations requiring

choice of law analysis. The same difficulties would be present if a court has to follow the
procedure of a foreign jurisdiction).
256. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782.

1422

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[vOL. 53:1377

jurisdiction, (2) "tribunal," (3) "foreign or international," and (4)

"interested person" should be provided. Therefore, the proposed section
would be drafted as follows:

(a) For the purposes of this section(1) a person or entity will be considered to "reside" or "be found"
in a district if a court could otherwise have personal jurisdiction
257
over said person or entity;
(2) a "tribunal"includes conventional courts, agencies and other
organizations with administrative and quasi-judicial powers,
and ad hoc and private arbitral panels and tribunals with power
to issue decisions binding the parties, regardless of whether this
power has been conferred through provisions contained in an
international convention or agreement, a domestic statute, or a
25 8
contractual agreement;
(3) a tribunal will be "foreign or international" when the tribunal

is established anywhere outside the United States or is created
25 9
under the laws of a foreign country or international law;
(4) "interested person" includes litigants before foreign or
international tribunals; foreign and international officials; and

any other person or entity, whether designated by foreign law,
international convention,

or otherwise having a reasonable

26 0
interest in obtaining assistance of the court.

The inclusion of these proposed definitions in the body of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 would have the effect of precluding judicial input as to the
meaning of foreign or international tribunals, discussed in Part III.B.
It would also severely limit the exercise of judicial discretion with

regard to the extraterritorial application of the statute, by clarifying
that the focus of a § 1782(a) inquiry is in where the party from whom
discovery is sought "is found" or "resides," and not on the documents'

location. 26 i Therefore, so long as the party fulfills the "residency"

257. This approach is respectful of the Supreme Court's view that under the
American judicial system and out of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice," a court should not entertain a case unless there is a somehow substantial
relationship with the forum, as indicated by the presence of certain minimum contacts.
See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
258. See Smit, American Assistance, supra note 14, at 5 ("The [use] of the word
'tribunal'... was deliberate, for the drafters wanted to make the assistance provided for
available to all bodies with adjudicatory functions. Clearly, private arbitral tribunals
come within the term the drafters used."); Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 258 (describing the
word "tribunal").
259. Smit, American Assistance, supra note 14, at 8.
260. This definition of interested person was formulated by Hans Smit. See Smit,
International Litigation, supra note 1, at 1027; Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 257 (discussing
documents sought by an "interested person").
261. Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2016).
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requirement as defined by the statute, extraterritorial application is
appropriate. The requirement that there are substantial connections
between the party producing the documents and the court deciding to
grant the discovery application would only provide further support to
the permissibility of applying the statute extraterritorially.

In conclusion, amending the statute would, by itself, largely
address the issues labeled by this article as (1) extraterritorial
application, addressed in Part III.A, and (2) meaning of "foreign or

international tribunals," addressed in Part III.B. Although the
currently disrupted political process may call into question the
feasibility of passing any kind of legislative measure, the amendment
to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 seems a good candidate for bipartisan support as it
plays a role in encouraging the creation of adequate resolution
processes in the field of international commercial transactions;
increases the role and influence of United States courts in
international litigation and dispute resolution processes, including

how they are handled and resolved; and provides (paired with the
codification of a modified judicial balancing test, discussed below)
renewed protections to domestic parties and interests.
2.

The Judicial Discretion Portion: Codifying a Modified Intel Test.

The second prong of this Note's proposed solution addresses those
issues that cannot be solved expressly through the previous changes to
the statute's language. It also intends to function as a safety net to
ensure that, should any interpretative issues persist or a new nature
of conflicts arise, there is a framework that can be employed by courts
to uniformly decide the outcome of § 1782 requests. In particular, this
Note advocates for codifying a limited Intel analysis. A limited
approach is appropriate because it would constrict the courts' exercise
of discretion, which in turn promotes predictability and fairness,
without completely precluding the courts from exercising some
flexibility in their analysis in the event they are presented with new
facts and issues that cannot be adequately addressed by mere reference
to the language of the statute. The codification of this limited Intel

analysis would look as follows:
(d) In determining whether a request for discovery under the
present statute should be granted, the following factors shall
provide a basis to deny discovery:
(1) one or more requirements set forth in § 1782(b) have not been

fulfilled; 26 2 or

262. The solution's proposed § 1782(b) would correspond to § 1782(a) under the
current version of the statute. See supra Part IV.B.1.ii.
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(2) the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in
the foreign proceeding. A person or entity will be considered to
be a participant in the foreign proceeding if the person or entity
is an "interested person" under the definition provided in

subsection (a) of this provision, or is a person or entity that
guards a close and material relationship to any such "interested
person";
(3) the request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proofgathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the
United States. A request will be deemed to attempt to circumvent
foreign or domestic policy when obtention of discovery pursuant

to such request:
(i) is contrary to a foreign rule expressly banishing obtention of

discovery of the kind requested; or
(ii) clearly undermines the public policy of the United States,

including ethical rules and privileges governing the conduct of
domestic counsel.
(4) the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome. Whether a
request is unduly intrusive or burdensome shall be decided by
reference to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in
particular, Rule 26(b);
(5) the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the
proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of foreign

government or the court or agency abroad to US federal court
judicial assistance counsel against granting discovery. In no
circumstance will this factor, by itself, provide sufficient reason
to deny a discovery request under this statute.
First, this revised codified version of Intel maintains the initial
statutory-compliance analysis, which would now require courts to
evaluate the three statutory requirements in light of the definitions

proposed in Part IV.B.1.ii. and in accordance with the goals set by
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in particular, Rules 26, 34, and
45.263 Failure to fulfill any of those requirements would translate into

immediate denial of the request for discovery.
In those cases in which the requirements are met, the court would
engage in a limited evaluation of the four Intel factors, transitioning
from the current nonexhaustive approach to an exhaustive approach.
Listing the factors in the order in which they appear in the current
Intel analysis, the first factor, namely, "whether the person from whom
discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding," would
remain as is. However, the statute would provide a definition to the
term "participant"that would help courts determine when a person or

263. These rules are specifically included due to their particular and concrete
impact on some of the § 1782 issues, especially with regard to the extraterritoriality
issue.

20201

INTERPRETATIVE CHALLENGES OF 28 U.S.C § 1782

1425

entity would qualify as such. Issuing this kind of guidance would
delimit the proper scope and understanding of the word as it operates
in

§ 1782 and avoid unduly or excessive exercises of discretion by lower

courts. At the same time, it would allow the court to set forth an
understanding of the
expeditions." 26 4

word that curtails any potential "fishing

The second factor, "the nature of the foreign tribunal, the
character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of
foreign government or the court or agency abroad to US federal court
judicial assistance" should be deemed as the weakest factor, working
only to the effect of "untying" situations in which it is unclear whether
the court should grant or deny an application. 26 5 This interpretation

would leave untouched a court's ability to take into consideration
comity concerns but would discount their importance, allowing them to
play a role only in "coin-toss" situations in which there would be

separate, more relevant rationales motivating the denial of a
request.2 6 6 The third factor, whether the request "conceals an attempt
to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a
foreign country or the United States" should be read to only preclude
obtaining discovery in those situations in which obtention of discovery
would either (i) be contrary to a foreign rule expressly banishing
obtention of discovery of the kind requested or (ii) clearly undermine
the public policy of the United States, including ethical rules and

privileges governing the conduct of domestic counsel. 26 7 Restricting the
reading of the third factor would increase the instances in which

applicants can benefit from the application of

§ 1782. It would also

avoid domestic court interpretation of foreign procedural and
evidentiary rules, unless such foreign rule unequivocally prohibits the

applicant from obtaining the discovery. Finally, it would allow courts
to restrict requests seeking to obtain documents that implicate an

attorney-client
confidentiality,

relationship,
the
work-product
doctrine,
and other similar concerns. Finally, the fourth

requirement, "whether the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome"
should be refined through the specification of particular categories of
requests that are considered either unduly intrusive, burdensome, or
both. By tying the definition of "unduly intrusive" and "burdensome"

to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and specifically, Rule 26, the
courts would be directed to treat these considerations in a

264. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing EPOJA's limitation on discovery requests,
motivated by local dislike of expansive discovery orders).
265. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264.
266. See generally Donald Earl Childress II, Comity as Conflict: Resituating
International Comity as Conflicts of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010) (criticizing
the unbridled use of comity by courts and proposing a new approach to the issue that
would avoid applying the concept in situations where it is unnecessary).
267. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 265.
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transnational litigation context in the same way they treat them when
the case is purely domestic. As part of this categorization, the court

could include untimeliness, so long as it has been unreasonably caused
by the applicant. The changes in this fourth factor would do away with
the issue discussed in Part III.C, applicant delay.

V. CONCLUSION

Throughout the last century, the United States has recognized the
importance of international transactions and has accordingly

developed a system of international judicial cooperation. This system
gradually strengthened through the subscription to international

agreements and implementation of domestic statutes and regulations,
including 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782, granting parties access to the system of

American discovery for use in foreign litigation and dispute resolution.
In line with the liberal spirit of American discovery, Congress has

continuously broadened

§ 1782, with the Supreme Court accordingly

adopting an extensive interpretation of the statute's scope in its

landmark decision Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
As disagreements over the interpretation of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1782 and

Intel continue to arise in lower courts, it has become clear that
reforming the statute's current wording is necessary. This Note
suggests an approach that includes a new Definitions Section inspired

by the United Kingdom's EPOJA, paired with the codification of a
restrictive interpretation of Intel's balancing test. Such a solution
might prove the best way of achieving an American-driven system of
international judicial cooperation that preserves the integrity of our
adversarial system and protects domestic interests. Although
ambitious in its requirements of bipartisan cooperation and

coordinated action among the three branches, this approach could lead
to greater uniformity, and consequently, more just decisions in the

context of discovery-related assistance to foreign parties and courts.
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